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Bridging migration research, policy, and practice
Executive Summary

With major legislative changes underway with Bill C-24, this report provides a review of academic literature published from 2009 to 2013 pertaining to citizenship acquisition and the outcomes of citizen and non-citizen immigrants in Canada and elsewhere. Following guidelines set by CIC, it addresses four key themes: citizenship take-up, outcomes for applicants and naturalized citizens, citizenship awareness and attachment to Canada, and international perspectives on citizenship.

Three overarching themes emerge in the course of this literature review. First, available evidence shows that Canada has fared quite well with its citizenship policy to date, and that this success is likely the reason why large-scale immigration to Canada enjoys relatively high levels of public and political support. In international comparisons, Canada’s policies are considered exemplary. Until now, the majority of newcomers to Canada have naturalized quickly; jus soli and dual citizenship provisions have ensured that first- and second-generation immigrants face comparatively low barriers to full legal membership in the Canadian community. As full members, naturalized immigrants and their Canadian-born children have a political voice that reduces incentives for political actors to engage in anti-immigrant rhetoric, hence preventing the legal and symbolic exclusion of large segments of the resident population that, in recent decades, has made immigration a divisive topic in the United States and Europe.

The second overarching theme is that it is difficult to discuss citizenship policies and naturalization outcomes independently without reference to immigration policy, as the two go hand-in-glove to shape the outcomes of both naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants. Immigration policy determines who is on the path to citizenship (permanent residents), and how soon (immediate access to permanent residence status vs. two-step entry paths). It thus affects not only the characteristics of immigrants who seek citizenship, but the characteristics of the group of non-citizen immigrants that naturalized persons are often compared to in terms of economic and social outcomes.

The third overarching theme is that Canada seems to be in the process of adopting policies and practices that have been shown in other national contexts to be detrimental to naturalization and social cohesion. These include concrete changes to naturalization requirements (e.g. lengthening wait times and raising formal language requirements) and procedures (e.g. the introduction of more Ministerial discretion) as well as subtle symbolic changes to the climate in
which naturalization takes place (e.g. the reassertion of white, Anglo-Saxon values as core national values in the citizenship study guide). International perspectives – particularly from the United Kingdom and Germany – show that these material and symbolic changes are detrimental and extremely hard to reverse once set in motion.
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Overview

1. Introduction

On February 27th, 2014, Bill C-24, also known as the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, received its second reading in Canada’s House of Commons. News releases from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) tout the bill as a long-needed modernization of Canada’s citizenship policy, which last changed substantially in 1977. Bill C-24 contains several proposed changes: permanent residents will have to wait longer to apply for citizenship and be physically present in Canada for a longer period of time during that wait period than under current law; time spent in Canada as a non-permanent resident (e.g. as a temporary foreign worker) will no longer count toward the pre-citizenship residence period; applicants must meet higher language requirements; application fees will rise; the range of reasons for denying or revoking citizenship will expand, and Ministerial discretion in citizenship decisions will grow (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2014a).

While highlighting the need for extensive changes, CIC is quick to point to the broad successes of its current policies, under which Canada has achieved a naturalization rate of 85% of all eligible immigrants (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2014b). This rate is much higher than in the immigrant-receiving countries Canada usually compares itself to, like Australia (74%) and the United States (44%) (Statistics Canada 2013). Researchers credit Canada’s emphasis on immigration channels that award permanent resident status immediately upon arrival to the country, its relatively short residency requirement, low application costs, and a welcoming and supportive political climate producing the conditions necessary to achieve such a high naturalization rate (Triadafilopoulos 2012). They also assert that Canada’s high naturalization rate has been instrumental in preventing the growth in anti-immigrant politics witnessed over the past two decades in countries with lower naturalization rates, like many in Europe (Castles, Haas, and Miller 2014; Triadafilopoulos 2012).

With major legislative changes underway, this report provides a review of academic literature published from 2009 to 2013 pertaining to citizenship acquisition in Canada and elsewhere. Following guidelines set by CIC, it addresses four key themes: citizenship take-up, outcomes for applicants and naturalized citizens, citizenship awareness and attachment to Canada, and international perspectives on citizenship. By viewing Canada’s citizenship policies through an international, comparative lens, the report pays particular attention to the ways in which some
legislative changes proposed in Bill C-24 have been implemented elsewhere, what the results have been, and how they might be expected to affect citizenship acquisition in Canada.

This research synthesis attempts to answer the following list of guiding questions suggested in Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s Citizenship Knowledge Framework document (CIC 2013a). Our findings show that a number of these questions identify research gaps, which are listed at the end of the report.

**Theme 1 - Citizenship Take-up**

- What are the current rates of citizenship by: immigration category, years since landing, sex, age, geographic area of birth, education level and location of highest degree (in various combinations)?
- What are the determinants of citizenship take-up? Are they changing?
- What is the impact of official language proficiency on citizenship take-up?
- How does the new standardized language assessment impact citizenship take-up rates?
- How does a newcomer’s income affect citizenship take-up rates?
- What groups reside in Canada for the long term and do not apply for citizenship, and what are their characteristics?

**Theme 2 - Outcomes for Applicants and Naturalized Citizens (integration questions)**

- What are the economic outcomes of citizenship take-up? What are the economic outcomes of naturalized citizens compared to other immigrants and citizens by birth? (Employment rates, unemployment rates, occupation level, share in public administration, poverty rates [various measures])
- What are the social outcomes of citizenship take-up (see also next theme)?
- What services impact the integration outcomes of immigrants during the time it takes to become eligible to citizenship take-up? (Including various settlement services, official language learning, education and training).
- How do language, knowledge and residence requirements impact the outcomes of citizenship take-up?
- What has been the effect of recent policy changes related to these requirements?
- What factors determine a permanent resident’s decision to apply for citizenship?
- What are the determinants of citizenship test pass-rates?
• To what extent do the determinants of choosing to apply for citizenship differ from those of being successful once applied?

• How does one’s official language proficiency and its acquisition affect citizenship test pass-rates?

• Which citizenship applicants are having the most difficulty accessing citizenship? What are the barriers these applicants face, and how could their needs be addressed? Are there population segments encountering particular sets of challenges when seeking to obtain citizenship? What characterizes them?

• What are the profiles of vulnerable population segments having difficulties acquiring citizenships?

• What is the impact on families if some members are unable to pass the citizenship test while others are?

Theme 3 - Citizenship Awareness and Attachment to Canada

• How do immigrants, naturalized immigrants and citizens by birth compare in terms of indicators of attachment to Canada? (e.g. sense of belonging, confidence in institutions, sharing of key values, pride)

• What are the outcomes in terms of attachment to Canada of citizenship take-up?

• How do ethno-racial factors impact the same indicators of attachment to Canada

• Can the impact of citizenship acquisition on these indicators be isolated (see also previous theme)? How?

• How can the impact of awareness raising and citizenship education programs for all Canadians be effectively studied?

• How do various measures to enhance the integrity of the citizenship take-up process impact the understanding of citizenship?

• What are the social outcomes of naturalized citizens compared to other immigrants and citizens by birth? (sense of belonging, social connections, participation in social organizations, political participation excluding voting, voting)

• To what extent does dual citizenship policy impact sense of belonging and civic participation of newcomers and naturalized citizens?
Theme 4. International Perspectives on Citizenship

- What can be learned by comparing the Canadian citizenship regime to those of other countries?
- How do international and foreign developments affect domestic citizenship policies?
- How do changing population movements impact citizenship policy? (e.g. diaspora, temporary migration, circular migration)
- What are the changing patterns of persons born in Canada to parents with short-term or no status, including breakdown by status of parents? What are the source countries of parents with temporary status who give birth in Canada?

2. Major Themes Identified

Each Key Theme in the Research Synthesis section begins with an overview of trends in the literature on that theme. However, to facilitate a comparative analysis, the fourth theme, international perspectives on citizenship, has been integrated into the other themes.

When it comes to citizenship take-up rates, we know that the most recent cohort of eligible immigrants has a far lower take-up rate than prior cohorts. However, we do not have analyses that can explain this. The literature suggests that individual, institutional and macro-level determinants play a role in citizenship take-up rates. We particularly highlight the role of immigration policy in citizenship take-up rates. We suggest that increasingly restrictive immigration and citizenship policies create an environment in which taking up Canadian citizenship becomes both more difficult and less attractive.

In terms of the outcomes for applicants and naturalized citizens, citizenship acquisition has a clear, positive net effect on immigrants’ income and labour market outcomes when naturalized immigrants are compared to non-naturalized immigrants who have permanent residence status. However, this effect is smaller in Canada than in comparable OECD countries. This suggests that Canadian immigration and settlement policies to date have narrowed the potential gap between naturalized and non-naturalized citizens.

Data suggest that there is very little difference between non-naturalized immigrants, naturalized immigrants, and citizens by birth in terms of citizenship awareness and attachment to Canada. In the literature, citizenship awareness and attachment are often discussed in terms of the subjective feelings of belonging and acts of political and civic participation. The literature has
grappled with policy shifts in the European context that have moved towards increasingly restrictive approaches to granting citizenship, which make integration a condition of citizenship rather treating citizenship as an avenue towards the full integration of immigrants in the receiving country. The evidence suggests that such restrictive policies have a negative impact on citizenship awareness and attachment.
Research Synthesis

Key Theme 1 – Citizenship Take-Up

Introduction

There continues to be relatively little information available that identifies the factors contributing to citizenship take-up rates in Canada, as is already reflected in CIC’s Citizenship Knowledge Framework of 2013 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2013a). This Knowledge Framework drew strongly on Picot and Hou (2011) and two documents that were internal to CIC. Work on factors that determine citizenship take-up rates tends to be cross-national and comparative; after all, citizenship regimes vary at the country level. Much rarer is work that focuses on the differences between migrant groups within a given national context. Most material that has emerged on this theme between 2009 and 2013 focuses on either the United States or Europe. As a result, our discussion of this theme draws on scholarship that is international in scope, moving beyond the Canadian context.

In terms of framing, most new studies build on Bloemraad (2006), who looked at the factors explaining the dramatic differences in citizenship take-up rates in the United States, which are relatively low, and Canada, which are much higher by comparison. Bloemraad and those who follow in her footsteps look into the effects of institutional contexts on citizenship take-up. This marks a turning point in the literature from a focus on individual-level determinants to an interest in the ways in which broader, national and international factors influence whether or not immigrants naturalize in their country of reception. Indeed, following Bauböck’s (2010) notion of “citizenship constellations”, recent work on the determinants of naturalization sees the process not as an individual decision related exclusively to personal traits/histories and receiving country policies, but as the result of individuals’ simultaneous links to different political entities (e.g. states, supranational institutions like the EU), and links among those political entities (which often inform each other’s policies).

Conceptually, answering the questions posed in this section involves reference to naturalization rates, and it is worth noting that some recent scholarship addresses how naturalization rates are defined and operationalized. For example, Janoski (2013) presents different ways of measuring naturalization and considers the availability of data necessary to do so. Broadly, he distinguishes between narrow and wide conceptualizations of naturalization. Narrow
conceptualizations, by far the most common in naturalization statistics, take into account the acquisition of citizenship by foreign-born nationals by means of a formal bureaucratic process; in contrast, wide conceptualizations take into account the acquisition of citizenship at birth by children born to immigrant parents, through jus soli provisions. Looking at data from 18 countries in Europe, North America (including Canada), and Asia, Janoski (2013) shows how changing the definition of naturalization affects naturalization rate estimates. In the case of Canada, this shifting lens affects the number of naturalizations, but does not affect the country’s standing as having the highest naturalization rate among all countries considered. Janoski (2013) and Helbling (2013) point out that the utility of naturalization rates as a basis for assessing citizenship policy is limited, because they are rarely disaggregated according to cohort-specific (i.e. by time of arrival) or group-specific (e.g. by region of origin) trends which may reveal systemic barriers. Additionally, they reveal nothing about the relative importance of immigrants’ desire to naturalize and states’ impediments in determining the rate. In other words, naturalization rates may say more about the demand side of citizenship acquisition (e.g. changes in inflows) than about the supply side (i.e. the policies themselves and their implementation). One alternative measure proposed by these researchers is rejection rates, as they “focus on actual state efforts to deny citizenship to those who apply” (Janoski 2013:664).

Note that in this literature citizenship up-take or naturalization is the end point of a migration process that is itself structured by distinct immigration policies. In the Canadian context, as elsewhere, almost all immigrants need to first establish permanent residence for a given period of time before they are eligible to apply for citizenship. (There are exceptions for those born to Canadian parents abroad; such individuals can apply for citizenship without having to establish residence.) The process of obtaining that residence status becomes itself a factor that can potentially affect citizenship uptake.

**Current Rates of Citizenship**

According to National Household Survey (NHS) data, 85.6% of the foreign-born population in Canada that was eligible to acquire Canadian citizenship in 2011 had done so (Statistics Canada 2013). While data are available from the 2011 NHS on naturalization by immigrant cohort, sex, age, and geographic area of birth, these data have only recently become available and thus have not yet been incorporated into extensive analytical studies of citizenship uptake. There are no data available on the relationship between immigration category and naturalization. Available analysis shows that naturalization rates vary by immigrant cohort, i.e.
the period in which an immigrant arrived in Canada. While the naturalization rate for immigrants who arrived in various cohorts up to 2000 is consistently over 90%, it was 77.2% for those who arrived between 2001 and 2005, and only 36.7% for those who arrived in 2006 and 2007 and who were eligible at the time of the NHS in early 2011 (Statistics Canada 2013).

**Citizenship Take-Up Rates: Individual, Institutional and Macro-Level Determinants**

At the individual level, several traits are correlated with citizenship take-up, including gender, country of origin, income, education, length of residence, and proficiency in a receiving country’s language (see, for example, Bevelander and Pendakur 2012; Chiswick and Miller 2009; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Liebig and Von Haaren 2011; Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012; Picot and Hou 2011). It would be imprudent to speak of “determinants” in a strict sense, as these correlations are derived from large-scale, quantitative studies that cannot reveal the mechanisms behind the patterns they identify. In a quantitative study of naturalization in OECD countries, Liebig and Von Haaren (2011) show that women have a higher tendency to naturalize than men, and the authors speculate that this may be due to the fact that women are overrepresented in spousal reunification entry streams and thus have a strong commitment to settling in the receiving country from the outset. There is also a greater tendency for immigrants from low-income sending countries – particularly in Asia and Africa – to naturalize, compared to immigrants from high-income (i.e. other OECD) countries. While Canada shares this tendency with other OECD countries, the differences in naturalization rates between immigrants from high-income countries and low-income countries are less pronounced here than elsewhere: compared to the estimated overall naturalization rate in Canada in 2007 of 89%, 83% of immigrants from high-income countries had naturalized, while between 90% and 96% of low-income countries in various world regions had done so (Liebig and Von Haaren 2011:28). Naturalized immigrants are more likely than non-naturalized immigrants to be highly educated; again, Canada exhibits this tendency only mildly, compared with other OECD countries: in 2007, 26% of naturalized immigrants were highly educated, compared to 17% of non-naturalized immigrants (Liebig and Von Haaren 2011:31). Across OECD countries, including Canada, the higher tendency of naturalized immigrants to be highly educated (compared to non-naturalized immigrants) is even stronger among immigrants from low-income countries. In other words, when it comes to individual traits of those taking up Canadian citizenship, the authors note a strong selection bias toward highly qualified immigrants, particularly among immigrants from low-income countries.
Some work has gone beyond individual traits to consider the “ideal, emotional or psychological factors” that play a role in the decision to naturalize (Hyde, Mateo, and Cusato-Rosa 2013). While there is a tendency to reduce the ideal/psychological component of the naturalization decision to cost-benefit analyses on the part of individuals (i.e. anticipated gains in social benefits, the ability to travel, etc.; see, for example, Chiswick and Miller 2009; Nam and Kim 2012; Environics 2012), Hyde et al. (2013) draw on interviews with Dominican immigrants in the United States to argue that subjective feelings of “being American” or of betraying one’s homeland can affect the way in which “costs” and “benefits” are defined and weighed against each other. For example, for individuals who feel that naturalization represents a betrayal of their home country, material benefits are weighed not just against materials costs, but against emotional costs as well.

Other work turns to the impact of institutional factors on citizenship take-up rates. According to Picot and Hou (2011), citizenship take-up rates vary according to the entry class an individual arrived in Canada under, with refugees being the most likely to naturalize, followed by skilled economic immigrants and family-class immigrants. This suggests that institutional factors matter, over and above or in addition to individual-level cost-benefit analyses.

As these additions to the focus on individual traits suggest, there has been a shift in focus in this area of research. While the correlation between individual traits and citizenship take-up seem to be relatively constant over time and across different national contexts, the way researchers approach the matter has changed. All of the recent studies we have reviewed move beyond individual-level factors (while taking them into account) to examine meso-level (e.g. community) and macro-level (e.g. sending and receiving state) factors that mediate the relationship between individual characteristics and the likelihood of someone naturalizing.

From this perspective, the decision to naturalize can be mediated by meso-level dynamics. For the United States, Logan et al. (2012) show that immigrants are more likely to naturalize in communities where a high share of other immigrants have naturalized.

It can also be mediated by macro-level dynamics, either directly (through policy) or indirectly (through the general climate of reception for immigrants). As for direct effects, particular attention has been paid to sending country policies, particularly how citizens of countries that allow expatriate citizens to hold dual citizenship are more likely to naturalize than citizens of countries that do not allow it (see, for example, Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012; Mazzolari 2009).
For the United States, Logan et al. (2012) show that Hispanics from countries of origin that allow dual citizenship are 31% more likely to naturalize than Hispanics from countries of origin that do not allow it. Mazzolari (2009) also identifies this tendency for Dominicans in the United States, but points out that the effect is strongest for recent adopters following a policy change; from this perspective, the positive effect on sending-country dual-citizenship policies might be the result of citizens “catching” up once the personal and legal costs of naturalizing are lowered.

Building on earlier work by Bloemraad (2006), Logan et al. (2012) also examine the direct effects of the receptiveness of receiving country policies on the tendency of immigrants in the United States to naturalize. Taking the degree of restrictiveness individual federal states demonstrate toward immigrant access to services such as welfare benefits, they show that immigrants in more restrictive states are more likely to naturalize than their counterparts in state where access to services is more widely granted to non-citizen immigrants.

*The Impact of Citizenship Policy on Citizenship Take-Up Rates*

Efforts have also been made to examine the relationship between citizenship and immigration policies in receiving countries and naturalization rates, through indices like the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) (Huddleston 2013). MIPEX is a tool for assessing and comparing integration policies across 31 countries on the basis of indicators pertaining to labour-marked mobility, family reunification, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality, anti-discrimination efforts, and education of migrant pupils. Indirect macro-level effects may include whether or not the receiving country is generally receptive or hostile toward immigrants. For example, while only 6% of immigrants in Canada – which has a relatively warm context of reception (Reitz 2012) – cite the instrumental desire for a Canadian passport as an important reason for naturalizing (Envirionics 2012), one small-scale, non-representative study shows that immigrants in the United Kingdom – where the context of reception is more heavily dominated by anti-immigrant rhetoric – cite obtaining a passport as their prime motivation to naturalize (MacGregor and Bailey 2012).

The literature on policy effects in receiving countries points to the role of citizenship policy implementation processes (i.e. the actual bureaucracy encountered by applicants) in determining citizenship take-up (see, for example, Huddleston 2013; Hyde, Mateo, and Cusato-Rosa 2013). This work shows that implementation factors such as processing times, documentation requirements (and the waiving of such requirements in the case of refugees
and/or institutionally weak countries of origin), bureaucratic discretion, recourse to judicial review, and discrimination must be taken into account when assessing the openness or restrictiveness of citizenship legislation. Having generous legal provisions for naturalization in place does not guarantee that naturalization provisions are actually generous. In fact, it is possible to have quite expansive naturalization provisions on the books but an extremely restrictive implementation process that ensures that those provisions are used sparingly. Huddleston (2013) demonstrates this phenomenon using an index for measuring the bureaucratic aspect of naturalization procedures and performing bivariate correlation analyses between index scores for citizenship legislation and index scores for implementation procedures in 35 European countries. The implementation index takes into account five dimensions of implementation: promotion (how authorities help applicants meet legal requirements); documentation (how applicants prove that they meet legal requirements); discretion (how much room authorities have to interpret legal requirements); and review (how strong judicial oversight of the naturalization procedure is). In general, the overall scores for accessible implementation procedures were unfavourable: the average score was 0.42 out of 1.0 (0.0 representing unfavourable implementation procedures and 1.0 representing fully favourable procedures); only 13 countries received a score of 0.5 or higher. Some countries with extremely restrictive citizenship policies had relatively high implementation scores (e.g. Estonia and Latvia), while others with rather liberal citizenship provisions had relatively low (i.e. poor) implementation scores (e.g. Cyprus, Ireland, Malta), suggesting that implementation processes have an important independent effect on naturalization. Huddleston (2013) also analyzes the relationship among implementation dimensions and finds correlations among the measures for discretion, bureaucracy, and documentation: the more complicated the documentation requirements, the higher the level of bureaucracy; the higher the level of bureaucracy, the higher the level of discretion; and the higher the level of discretion, the lower the level of judicial review. For Canada, these results suggest two things. First, any assessment of the openness of Canada’s naturalization laws must go beyond legislation to take into account implementation procedures. Second, expanding Ministerial discretion, as Canada intends to do (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2014a), will make Canada’s implementation processes less favourable by the standards of such indices.

Procedural impediments to naturalization can affect citizenship uptake by material or symbolic means; in other words, some potential citizens may not be able to fulfil tangible documentation requirements or have the skills and resources to navigate bureaucracy, while other potential
citizens may feel symbolically excluded and thus be dissuaded from applying. Hyde et al. (2013), Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos (2012), and Blinder (2013) have made these points with reference to the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, respectively. In their qualitative investigation of why Dominicans in the United States tend not to naturalize, Hyde et al.'s (2013) Dominican research subjects expressed trepidation about the high cost of the procedure, uncertainty about their ability to comprehend and navigate the procedure, and distaste for the invasive nature of the scrutiny carried out by government agencies, as factors contributing to their unwillingness to adopt American citizenship. In their analysis of the effects of major changes to German naturalization policy in 1999, Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos (2012) argue that the introduction of new administrative procedures and requirements (e.g. residency requirements, the discretion of officials to judge the compatibility of applicants' political persuasions with German constitutional values, and language tests) created both material and symbolic barriers to naturalization that have left naturalization rates in Germany comparatively low, even as the law regulating citizenship ostensibly became more open. Among the symbolic aspects were the questions on citizenship tests directed implicitly (but obviously) toward Muslims which – taken alongside a virulently anti-Muslim political discourse – did nothing to suggest to potential applicants with a Muslim background that attempting to overcome material barriers was worthwhile. The scrutiny placed on certain immigrants has a path-dependent effect on the desire of 1.5 or second-generation immigrants to naturalize, even if legal barriers faced by their parents are removed, as they were in Germany in 1999. The marginalized youth of Turkish and Moroccan descent studied by Bucerius (2012), who had grown up in context that is hostile toward their citizenship acquisition, saw the legal changes to expand roads to citizenship acquisition as a ploy by German politicians to feel better about themselves, not as a signal that racialized 1.5 and second-generation youth are actually welcome to join the national community. Finally, Blinder’s (2013) overview of naturalization in the United Kingdom shows explicitly the material impact that implementation processes can have on the ability of immigrants to naturalize: in 2012, 37% of citizenship applicants in that country were refused for not meeting the “good character” criterion, a highly discretionary measure derived from applicants’ criminal and civil records and financial background.

Canada is currently reassessing its citizenship policies. Bill C-24 will increase Ministerial discretion in a number of ways, which will carry the risks outlined in the literature. In particular, by making the grant of citizenship dependent on the intent to reside in Canada, where the assessment of that intent can take place anytime after citizenship has been granted, Bill C-24
potentially places all naturalized citizens under life-time scrutiny according to unclear criteria. As
the literature indicates, the uncertainties engendered by this Bill if it becomes law are likely to
result in lower citizenship take-up rates.

The Impact of Immigration Policy on Citizenship Take-Up Rates
At the policy level, it is not just citizenship policy that affects citizenship take-up; immigration
policy plays a crucial role in determining how many immigrants have access to permanent
resident status, which is a main prerequisite of citizenship acquisition. Here researchers point to
two concerning trends in Canada: the shift from permanent to temporary migration, which
delays or prevents newcomers’ access to permanent resident status (Alboim and Cohl 2012;
Goldring and Landolt 2011); and, within that shift, the transfer of responsibility for permanent
resident selection from the federal government to employers, who may be private individuals or
corporations (Valiani 2013). In 2012, Canada was home to 257,887 permanent residents, with
this population holding steady at 0.7 percent of the total population from 1989 onward
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2013b:3). By contrast, in 2012, temporary residents
numbered 1,091,876, with 491,547 of those temporary foreign workers, whose visas depend on
their continued employment (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2013b:53).

Many temporary migration schemes preclude access to permanent residence: in these
programs (e.g. the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program), there is no possibility for temporary
residents to transition to permanent residence and settlement. Once their temporary stay in
Canada reaches its end, they are expected to leave the country. Other temporary migration
schemes provide a pathway to permanent residence and settlement after a probationary period
of time in country; researchers refer to such schemes as “two-step migration” pathways
(Goldring and Landolt 2012). The Live-in Caregiver Program and Provincial Nominee Programs
are examples of schemes in which workers enter the country on a temporary visa and are
allowed, after a period of time, to apply for permanent residence under certain conditions (e.g.
renewal of employment contracts). In two-step migration pathways, responsibility for permanent
resident selection is thus transferred to private individuals or corporations, because they are
responsible for renewing the employment contracts that are a main condition of the transition to
permanent residence. Placing the power to determine whether temporary migrants achieve
permanent residence status in the hands of private individuals or firms not only opens up the
possibility of exploitation and arbitrariness. In addition, it seems to be leading to a decreased
uptake of permanent resident status, making these take-up rates lower than intended by the
federal government. For example, the estimated retention rates (ERR) for individuals entering Canada under the Live-In Caregiver Program (one of the most important two-step pathways to permanent resident status) were as low as 28% in the period from 2003 to 2007, and retention rates for the Canadian Experience Class (the program that brings highly-skilled workers and their dependents into Canada for an initial temporary stay, but which allows those workers and dependents to apply for permanent residence after two years) were likewise below expectation (Valiani 2013:67–68). This is noteworthy because the admission of highly skilled workers has long been a policy priority of the Canadian government, and because the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP) was popular enough in recent years to attract more applications than could be processed within a reasonable period of time. Given Canada’s popularity as a destination for highly skilled workers in the past, a seeming disinterest on the part of this sought-after group for obtaining permanent residence through the Canadian Experience Class raises the question of whether permanent residence and potential citizenship is becoming a less attractive option for this group, and why.

**The Impact of Canada’s Official Language Policy and the New Standardized Language Assessment on Citizenship Take-Up Rates**

According to the literature we have reviewed so far, it is generally agreed that proficiency in the receiving country’s official language is positively linked to naturalization (Chiswick and Miller 2009; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012; Picot and Hou 2011). Looking at 15 European countries, Dronkers and Vink (2012) specify that speaking the language of the destination country at home increases the likelihood of taking up citizenship. In their study of naturalization among different ethnic groups in the United States, Logan et al. (2012) find that the positive effect of official language proficiency is most noticeable at the lower end of the language proficiency scale: compared to individuals who reported not speaking English at all, those who reported speaking it “not well” have double or more odds of naturalizing. In contrast, for blacks and Asians who reported speaking only English at home or speaking English well or very well, language ability had little effect on the odds of naturalizing.

Canada’s official language policy, which recognizes English and French as official languages, has long affected its immigration and citizenship policies, in that knowledge of one of those languages (ideally both) is a longstanding pre-requisite for achieving permanent residence and becoming a full citizen. The language requirements introduced in 2012 stipulate that “objective
evidence” of language proficiency must be submitted by citizenship applicants; this evidence can take the form of test results from a third party assessment, proof of post-secondary education completed in English or French, or the achievement of Canadian language Benchmark Level 4 through a government-funded language program (Alboim and Cohl 2012:3). As the authors point out, all of these forms of evidence involve significant financial costs, unless the applicant is eligible for free language training under the LINC program.

Changes proposed under Bill C-24 will further tighten the language requirements attached to achieving Canadian citizenship. Under current provisions, adults aged 18 to 54 are required to pass a language and knowledge test, whereby the knowledge test requirement may be fulfilled with the aid of an interpreter. Bill C-24 proposes to expand the group of individuals required to pass knowledge and language tests to include those aged 15 to 64, and the knowledge test must be completed in English or French. Such a change would in and of itself likely decrease the number of citizenship applicants and, of those, the number who pass the tests. Increasing language requirements will become an institutional barrier to citizenship take-up.

Newcomers’ Income and Citizenship Take-Up Rates

The literature generally agrees that income is positively linked to naturalization (Chiswick and Miller 2009; Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012; Picot and Hou 2011). For the United States, Logan et al. (2012), however, find that individuals in the middle-income bracket (as opposed to high or low-income bracket) are more likely to naturalize. However, the literature indicates that it is not clear precisely how income affects citizenship take-up, beyond the noted generally positive correlation. Chiswick and Miller (2009:122) advance the general claim that immigrants in the United States are more likely to naturalize “if they perceive that the benefits from being naturalized are greater and the costs of satisfying the requirements are lower.” Picking up on this thought, income may be positively correlated with citizenship acquisition because it reflects the attainment of a level of social status (e.g. stable employment in a well remunerated job, which – in turn – is predicated on a certain degree of investment in country-specific human capital) at which barriers to naturalization (e.g. fees, scrutiny by government agencies) are low and tangible benefits (e.g. access to even more lucrative public employment positions) are a realistic possibility. Taken as a marker of social class, higher incomes may be a proxy for the type of education that facilitates individuals’ understanding of and ability to navigate receiving country bureaucracies. Following from these considerations, the middle-income bracket in which individuals are most likely to naturalize in the US case might reflect the optimal point in the
utility-maximization function, where income (and attendant levels of social status) is high enough to overcome barriers to naturalization easily but still low enough to make the prospect of naturalization seem beneficial (e.g. through access to civil-servant positions reserved for citizens).

Non-Take up of Citizenship by Immigrant Group
The literature does not directly address the question of which long-term residents do not apply for citizenship status. However, based on the review of factors that facilitate citizenship take-up, we hypothesize that those who reside long term (depending on how that is defined) without acquiring citizenship could belong to one of two groups. They could be permanent resident immigrants from wealthy OECD countries, who are generally less likely to naturalize than their counterparts from low-income countries (Liebig and Von Haaren 2011). Alternatively, they could be temporary workers who remain in the country on successive contracts without achieving the permanent residence status that is necessary to apply for citizenship. If Bill C-24 is passed into law, these temporary workers will no longer be able to count their time spent in Canada on temporary permits toward the residency requirement for citizenship, meaning that their stay in Canada without access to the rights and privileges of citizenship will be lengthened. Thomas (2010) notes that temporary workers have different employment characteristics from their permanent resident counterparts: they tend to be in conditional employment, and they tend to experience barriers to accessing labour rights. Both of these factors are likely associated with lower and more unstable income, placing temporary workers outside the higher income brackets that are positively correlated with naturalization. As Goldring and Landolt (2011) show in their study of workers in Toronto, precarious employment does not end when temporary workers transition to permanent residence: rather, such workers are likely to remain in precarious employment. Add to this the increased admission of low-skilled workers in temporary migration streams in Canada since 2007 (Lenard and Straehle 2012a), and this group of potential future citizens also lacks another characteristic that is positively correlated with citizenship uptake: higher levels of education.

Key Theme 2 – Outcomes for Applicants and Naturalized Citizens

Introduction
Research from multiple national contexts reveals a positive link between citizenship acquisition and economic and other immigrant outcomes, independent of other factors that explain such
outcomes. This suggests that it is in the interest of all immigrant-receiving countries to facilitate citizenship access for those planning to reside permanently in the country. Furthermore, given the positive net impact of citizenship acquisition on outcomes, it makes sense to ensure that immigrants receive the assistance they need in order to meet the requirements.

Yet calculations regarding citizenship acquisition policies are not guided solely by their positive impact on immigrant outcomes. Indeed, most European countries have tended to restrict legal access to citizenship for immigrants and they increasingly use policy instruments like citizenship tests as a means of keeping naturalization rates low. While there is no definitive data on why Europeans do not support citizenship acquisition wholeheartedly, we suggest that there are two issues that influence this. First, the European experience with largely low-skilled labour migration through various guest worker programs and the migration from former colonies informed an anti-immigrant politics over the past decades (Goodman 2011; Triadafilopoulos 2012). Second, there seems to have been a shift towards understanding citizenship as either a reward for and symbol of successful integration rather than as a means of giving people the security to achieve that integration (Triadafilopoulos 2012). Canada, which continues to look towards immigration and subsequent citizenship acquisition as a nation-building exercise and a pathway towards integration, has encouraged naturalization as a way to create an overall welcoming climate of reception. The Canadian approach to citizenship and immigration with the goal of settlement has resulted in great economic and political benefits both for individual immigrants and the country as a whole (see, for example, Marwah and Triadafilopoulos 2009; Reitz 2012).

This Canadian warm welcome is increasingly extended only to certain immigrant groups who can make clear contributions to Canada’s economic growth (Neborak 2013). Indeed, an overarching concern that arises when looking at the outcomes of applicants and citizens is that Canadian citizenship and immigration policies seem to be moving in directions that we know (from the European context) to have detrimental effects on citizenship take-up, the outcomes of immigrants, and immigrants’ sense of belonging (Joppke 2013; Winter 2014). These include making citizenship access more contingent on education (and, thus, class) and ethno-cultural origins (Winter 2013), as well as shifts in the immigration balance away from permanent residents, who are legally on the path to full citizenship, to temporary foreign workers, the majority of whom have no guaranteed legal access to permanent residence and, eventually, citizenship (Goldring and Landolt 2013).
mostly entered the country with permanent residence and were thus on the road to full citizenship from the outset. With the rise of two-step migration pathways, in which the achievement of permanent residence is predicated on a probationary, temporary stay, access to full citizenship is now delayed for the majority of immigrants coming to Canada (and closed entirely for temporary migrants whose entry path precludes eventual access to permanent residence). In addition, the transition from temporary to permanent residency (if that is a possibility at all) increasingly rests on private decision-making (e.g. Ministerial discretion or employer decisions) over public accountability, which implies a dispersal of the Canadian government’s ability to address long-term needs of “building an inclusive society and stable labour supply” (Valiani 2013:55).

Finally, comparative data suggests that countries like Canada with well-developed immigrant settlement programs for those with permanent residence see a smaller impact of citizenship acquisition on immigrants’ outcomes than countries without such programs. This comparative data suggests that immigration policies can mimic the impact of citizenship policies on income, occupational attainment and poverty rates (Janoski 2013).

Economic and Other Outcomes of Naturalization and Citizenship Take-Up

As CIC (2013a) acknowledges, there are not many studies available on the relationship between naturalization and economic outcomes specifically for the Canadian case. Picot and Hou (2011) and Bevelander and Pendakur (2012) look at Canada comparatively. These and other studies identify a positive correlation between citizenship and economic outcomes such as earnings (referred to as the “citizenship premium”), employment rates, occupational distributions, and decreased welfare reliance (Bevelander and Pendakur 2012; Mazzolari 2009; Picot and Hou 2011; Steinhardt 2012).

In a study of naturalization in OECD countries, including Canada, Liebig and Von Haaren (2011:34) show that citizenship acquisition is associated with slightly higher probabilities of being in employment. For Canada, those probabilities are four percent and six percent higher for men and women, respectively. This is much lower than in European countries such as Germany, Belgium, and Denmark, where the probabilities exceed ten percentage points. While they also find a relationship between citizenship status and occupational level, the differences for Canada are again relatively small: the share of naturalized men and women in low occupational level positions is four percent lower than the share of non-naturalized men and
women at that occupational level; likewise, the share of naturalized men and women at a high occupational level is five percent and four percent higher (respectively) than the share of non-naturalized immigrants at that occupational level (Liebig and Von Haaren 2011:35). In contrast to other countries in the OECD study, Canada did not provide data with which to disaggregate these findings by country of origin (high-income vs. low-income countries). For the countries that provided such data, naturalization effects are generally stronger (in some cases a difference of ten to 24 percentage points) for naturalized immigrants from low-income countries compared to naturalized immigrants from high-income countries. The interaction between country of origin and naturalization may also have a significant impact on earnings differentials between naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants. Here, the authors cite DeVoretz and Pivnenko (2008) as stating (based on data from the 2001 Census) that the wage gap between immigrants with and without Canadian citizenship is about 29% for individuals from lower income countries and 10% for those from high income countries.

The relatively small effect of naturalization on employment and occupational level in the OECD comparison of naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants suggests that Canada’s immigration system has likely played a strong role in shaping new citizens’ outcomes. Based on data pre-dating 2007 (and thus not yet able to capture the effects of the major shift away from permanent resident admissions and toward temporary worker admissions), the results suggest that non-naturalized permanent residents are in a strong position to derive economic gains from their stay in Canada, and that this strong position is augmented only slightly through the acquisition of citizenship.

Changes in Canada’s immigration policy that emphasize temporary over permanent residence make methodological discussions pertaining to the measurement of immigrant citizen vs. immigrant non-citizen outcomes particularly pertinent for the Canadian national context. This recent discussion, carried out by Janoski (2013) and others, raises the issue of reference groups. They ask whether naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants are comparable groups, if the former had the benefit of permanent residence status (with its attendant labour market access, integration service provision, and access to public resources) while the latter did not. They argue that comparisons between groups of naturalized citizens who benefitted from the services they could access as permanent residents to immigrants who have spent a substantial amount of time in Canada as temporary residents without access to such services run the risk of either overstating the value of citizenship status and/or immigrant personal traits while
underestimating the effect of immigration policy in determining measured outcomes such as income, occupational attainment, and poverty rates.

It will be interesting in the future to see if the differentials between citizen and non-citizen immigrants in Canada remain so small, given that these differences seem to result largely from a) immigration policies that select for immigrants with individual characteristics that are generally associated with positive outcomes in terms of social and economic participation and b) the provision of settlement services to permanent residents. If Canada’s immigration policies continue to move in the direction of admitting more temporary residents than permanent residents and delaying access to permanent residence (and settlement services) through two-step migration paths, the smaller number of immigrants eligible for citizenship status will likely be those who do well on individual level outcomes. This will create the impression that citizenship status confers benefits, but it will also mask the fact that this outcome is the result of immigrant selection policies.

The literature that explores the relationship between citizenship and positive economic outcomes is mainly an economic literature. This literature is unclear on the precise mechanisms that are behind the correlation between citizenship and positive economic outcomes. Again, the explanations offered tend to focus on a mix of individual-level characteristics and institutional factors, including that citizenship gives immigrants formal access to a range of well-paying jobs (e.g. in the civil service), that it facilitates international travel for immigrants from countries with multiple visa requirements around the world, and that it signals to employers a commitment to remaining in the receiving country and hence leads to more favourable hiring decisions (Picot and Hou 2011). Steinhardt (2012) provides some evidence that the effect of citizenship acquisition in Germany is related to increased labour-market access, as non-EU citizens (whose labour-market access is generally limited until naturalization) who take up German citizenship experience an earnings increase, while EU citizens who take up their new country’s citizenship (but who have unrestricted access to the labour market prior to naturalization) do not. This would support arguments that the impact of citizenship acquisition depends on the larger institutional and citizenship policy context.

**Newcomers’ Non-Economic Outcomes and Citizenship Take-Up Rates**

While the literature has to a degree assessed the link between citizenship acquisition and individual-level economic outcomes, very little is known about non-economic outcomes.
literature suggests that social outcomes (sense of belonging, social connections, participation in social organizations, and political participation) are similar for Canadian naturalized citizen immigrants and citizens by birth (see, for example, Environics 2012; Marwah and Triadafilopoulos 2009). Where non-citizen immigrants are concerned, however, these findings are usually based on studies involving permanent residents, who enjoy a wide range of rights prior to naturalization. Recent literature on the rise of “two-step” immigration programs, in which people receive either limited temporary residence or undergo a period of conditional permanent residence, and on immigrants with “precarious status” suggests that the gap in outcomes might widen if the security of permanent resident status is increasingly denied to non-citizen immigrants (see, for example, Goldring and Landolt 2013; Lenard and Straehle 2012b; Rajkumar, Berkowitz, and Vosko 2012; Thomas 2010). According to Goldring and Landolt (2011), the gap in outcomes might even remain after the achievement of permanent resident status; their study of workers in Toronto shows that outcomes associated with entering Canada with a precarious status persist even after immigrants achieve permanent residence.

**Impact of Immigrant Services Prior to Citizenship Take-Up: Settlement Services, Official Language Learning, Education and Training**

Little is known about the impact of settlement services on immigrants’ decision to take up Canadian citizenship. While it would be very useful to know, we have currently no detailed information regarding how these processes affect permanent residents’ decision to apply for citizenship. Given that settlement services, official language learning, and education and training all have a positive impact on immigrant economic and other outcomes, we can surmise that they would facilitate citizenship up-take as well. However, research is needed to uncover how these factors affect citizenship take-up rates directly. Indeed, studies of concrete measures in place to facilitate the naturalization process provide some evidence that community-level measures (e.g. language courses, welcoming community initiatives) are beneficial (see, for example, Gilkinson and Sauvé 2010; MacGregor and Bailey 2012). This may be the result of both the content of such measures and the general sense of belonging that derives from increased interaction with other members of the community.

Some evidence for the UK suggests that official language learning has a beneficial impact on integration in the lead-up to naturalization, although in the British case the benefits appear to derive as much from the relationships immigrants build to the community in the course of attending training as from language acquisition itself (MacGregor and Bailey 2012). Other
studies confirm the importance of community belonging to the process of integration and propensity to naturalize. For example, Logan et al. (2012) find that immigrants in the United States are more likely to become citizens in local areas where a high share of immigrants have naturalized.

Although we have not uncovered material that explicitly deals with the link between settlement services, language training and integration/naturalization, the findings put forward under Theme 1, which indicate a link between knowledge of a receiving-country’s language and naturalization rates, suggest that language learning can only be beneficial. None of the literature we have reviewed supports the populist charge (louder in the European context, but not entirely absent from Canadian discourses) that a lack of proficiency in the receiving-country’s language is a result of immigrants’ unwillingness to learn it. Rather, concerns are growing that cuts to federal spending on settlement services, coupled with increased immigrant settlement in smaller communities with limited educational and public transportation infrastructure, are hindering immigrants’ ability to access affordable and effective language training (OCASI 2011).

Citizenship Tests: Pass Rates, Official Language Proficiency and Barriers to Citizenship Acquisition

While little information is available, data on citizenship test pass rates suggest that, aside from language ability (a basic level of which is required to read the test), education levels and country of origin have become an increasingly important determinant of the Canadian citizenship test’s pass rate (Winter 2014). Adjustments to Canada’s citizenship test have not yet transformed it from a policy instrument that facilitates integration into a policy instrument that (deliberately) limits access to full membership (Paquet 2012); however, there are concerns that the effect of education levels and country of origin are shaping access to citizenship along class and ethno-racial lines (Winter 2014; see also Goodman 2012).

According to Alboim and Cohl (2012), citizenship test pass rates were negatively affected by changes to the test guide and passing grade in 2009 and 2010: the test failure rate went from 4% before the introduction of the new guide in 2009 to approximately 15% after two adjustments to the minimum passing grade in the course of 2010. Against this backdrop, the authors note a “growing divide” between immigrant groups in their ability to pass the test, particularly between applicants from English-speaking countries and ones from Asian countries (which have been among the primary source countries for permanent residents for the past few decades). For
instance, the failure rate for applicants from Vietnam went from 14.8% in 2005 to 41.2% in 2011 (Alboim and Cohl 2012).

These data suggest some very preliminary conclusions about who might have difficulty accessing citizenship. According to insights from Alboim and Cohl (2012), applicants who are non-native speakers of English or French, with limited financial resources and/or who are located in remote areas are likely to have the most difficulty accessing citizenship, due to the difficulties they face in fulfilling the language requirements introduced in November 2012.

Citizenship Acquisition and Vulnerable Populations: Low Skill and Temporary Workers and Family Members

Information about test-takers suggests that both individual level (e.g. education, proficiency in one of the official languages, income) and institutional level (e.g. changing test requirements) factors create barriers to citizenship acquisition. In addition, current immigration policies also play a role in creating populations that risk being systematically excluded from citizenship acquisition. A number of researchers have raised concerns about the rising intake of temporary foreign workers (whose admissions now exceed those of permanent residents) into Canada, because – with the exception of Live-In Caregivers and people in the Canadian Experience Class – temporary admissions programs do not include a guaranteed legal means of transitioning to permanent resident status, which is the legal precursor to citizenship. Hence, a growing population of immigrants in Canada is set to remain in a vulnerable position of non-citizenship (see, for example, Alboim 2009; Goldring and Landolt 2013; Lenard and Straehle 2012b; Thomas 2010).

Low-skilled workers, whose numbers grew following the introduction of the Low-Skill Pilot Project in 2002, may also become a vulnerable population should they achieve permanent residence and wish to acquire citizenship, due to the strong relationship between education levels and ability to pass the newest Canadian citizenship test (Winter 2014).

Additionally, as Picot and Hou (2011) point out, immigrants who enter Canada as refugees are more likely than immigrants in other classes to naturalize, which means that tightened access to refugee status will ultimately pose difficulties for individuals who have entered Canada on humanitarian grounds in becoming full citizens.
Finally, citizenship tests can split family members into those who can and those who cannot pass the test. While no studies to date assess the impact that the test may have on families, work by Dreby (2012) and others on the United States points to the profound negative impact that differences between family members’ residency and citizenship status can have on family life in cases where the non-citizen family members are at risk of deportation (Menjivar and Abrego 2012; Yoshikawa, Kholoptseva, and Suárez-Orozco 2013). This effect manifests not only in the event that a non-citizen parent is deported, leaving a citizen child behind who then enters into the foster care system: the fear of forced separation weighs heavily on family members on a day-to-day basis (Dreby 2012). Given rising citizenship test failure rates in Canada, a question for researchers will be how differences between citizen and non-citizen permanent resident family members affect the lives of families. In addition, there will likely be an effect on families of those who are on the path to citizenship and those who are excluded from that status through migration policies. Preliminary research by Neborak (2013) suggests that changes to the requirements placed on family class migrants to Canada, such as the institution of the Super Visa (which does not grant access to permanent status) is profoundly affecting immigrant families whose reliance on their extended family networks is curtailed by these policy changes. A focus on families can highlight how the ability to acquire citizenship affects not only individuals but the families and ultimately communities that they live in.

**Key Theme 3 – Citizenship Awareness and Attachment to Canada**

**Introduction**

Underlying the question about “attachment to Canada” is the notion that citizenship has an emotional dimension that plays into social cohesion (Hyde, Mateo, and Cusato-Rosa 2013; Yuval-Davis 2011). The articles we have reviewed so far show that, before one asks whether new Canadians are identifying with Canada, one must ask what one is asking them to identify with. Several researchers point out that the content of national identity in liberal-democratic states (like Canada) that are perceived as relying on a “civic” rather than an “ethno-cultural” model of membership is not universal and value-neutral (see, for example, Goodman 2012; Harder 2010; Joppke 2010; Michalowski 2011). The lack of neutrality means that citizenship policies that emphasize common values create an unequal playing field that may facilitate the naturalization of some groups who, for historical-political reasons, have a greater understanding of (and affinity for) the national identity they are being asked to ascribe to, while creating a hurdle for other groups (see, for example, MacGregor and Bailey 2012).
Much current research points out that substantive changes in citizenship policies (e.g. mandatory integration courses and citizenship tests) as well as increased symbolic/discursive emphasis on values on the part of receiving country governments can have unintended, negative consequences for attachment to the new country. Substantive changes in citizenship policies and attendant practices can make immigrants undergoing the process of naturalizing feel like they belong less rather than more (see, for example, Lister and Jarvis 2013; MacGregor and Bailey 2012). Furthermore, recent studies suggest that efforts to move both settlement and citizenship policy – substantively and symbolically/discursively – toward an emphasis on shared national identity and values distracts from other issues that are known to have an impact on social cohesion such as fair access to employment commensurate with one’s skills and ethnic/racial discrimination (see, for example, Marwah and Triadafilopoulos 2009).

Attachment to Canada by Legal Status and Ethnic Category
Non-citizen immigrants, naturalized citizens and native-born Canadians seem to express similar levels of attachment to Canada, which, for many, begins at the time of becoming a permanent resident (Environics 2012; Gilkinson and Sauvé 2010). Whether or not immigrants form an attachment to Canada (or any other receiving country) could therefore have as much to do with the immigration policy that is in place, and whether that policy gives immigrants a long-term perspective from the outset, as it does with citizenship policy. Here, the literature on immigrant integration policies and citizenship tests is useful. It distinguishes between restrictive (illiberal) and inclusive (liberal) policy approaches to citizenship in order to discuss attachment as it relates to immigrant integration (Goodman 2012; see also Guild, Groenendijk, and Carrera 2009; Joppke 2010; Michalowski 2011). Restrictive policies create disincentives towards citizenship uptake because they treat citizenship as something that is exclusively held by those already belonging to the nation (Goodman 2012:662). In contrast, liberal approaches to integration result in policies “promoting an enriched citizenship by encouraging more participation and incentivizing naturalization of long-term residents” (Goodman 2012:662). Goodman (2012:662) further argues that “integration for permanent residence is more connected to citizenship in liberal regimes, reducing the importance of the latter and deemphasizing differences between the two statuses.” Canada has historically created a liberal citizenship regime and therefore has the potential to emphasize an inclusive approach to citizenship. However, as Goodman also shows in her analysis of the British case, such a history does not preclude the adoption of restrictive policies and a shift in immigration and citizenship regimes towards more exclusivity.
Of interest here is the fact that residence in Canada already promotes a relatively strong sense of attachment; for the moment, citizenship take-up does not seem to make a strong difference in whether or not someone feels an attachment to Canada. Surveys show that immigrants (recent and earlier) and native-born citizens express similar levels of attachment to Canada (Environics 2012; Gilkinson and Sauvé 2010). However, Gilkinson and Sauvé (2010:ii) show that there is a “decreased tendency for recent immigrants to ‘strongly agree’ with the various Canadian collective identities.” The fact that this coincides with an apparent drop in citizenship take-up rates amongst newer immigrants suggests the following research question: is a process of exclusion underway in which new immigrants find it harder to identify with Canadian citizenship and might be inclined to take up citizenship without the sense of attachment that a more inclusive definition of citizenship has inspired in prior groups of immigrants? Work that shows the lasting negative impact on a sense of belonging after the transformation of precarious into permanent status and subsequent citizenship acquisition is suggestive here.

While the mechanisms that relate citizenship policy to a sense of attachment are not specified in the current literature, procedural aspects of citizenship take-up may have unintended, negative consequences on outcomes. According to MacGregor and Bailey (2012), who studied citizenship applicants in the United Kingdom in a small qualitative study, some immigrants find the emphasis on values and perceived condescension on the part of street-level bureaucrats alienating. As Winter (2014) argues, Canada’s naturalization process has also become more cumbersome over the past decade, making it more difficult for individuals whose native language is neither English nor French. This could conceivably make some new citizens feel like outsiders and lead to the devaluation of citizenship as an instrumental good rather than shared value.

Research that shows how racialized groups interpret citizenship indicates how citizenship can be thus devalued. There is some evidence to suggest that ethno-cultural factors affect indicators of attachment to Canada. For example, Gilkinson and Sauvé (2010) show that the Black population in Canada has the lowest rates of identifying with Canada and the province in which they live. This suggests that racism and lack of economic access might play a role in the individual-level development of a Canadian identity.

Some research points out that ethno-cultural factors matter not just at the individual-level, but at the institutional level as well, in Canadian citizenship policy and the political and media
discourses around it. Harder and Zhyznomirska (2012, 294) argue that “the differing responses towards the Canadians evacuated from Lebanon and the Lost Canadians (i.e. the children and descendants of individuals who were deprived of Canadian citizenship by the 1947 Citizenship Act) represent an expression of a racialized and ethnicized hierarchy of Canadian citizenship onto which notions of ‘home’ and ‘away’, ‘family’ and ‘foreigner’ are mapped, and expectations of entitlement and obligation are elaborated.” More work is needed to understand how ethno-racial discourses around citizenship policy affect immigrants of varying origins.

The Potential Impact on Attachment to Canada of Current Directions in Citizenship Policy: The idea of “Good Citizenship”

Current directions in citizenship policy focus on “measures to enhance the integrity of the citizenship take-up process” (CIC 2013a). These measures refer to recent policy changes (legal and rhetorical) that aim at reducing the number of “citizens of convenience” and ensuring that all new citizens adopt Canadian values. However, the literature suggests that such measures have a negative impact on understandings of citizenship, by making it something that is primarily accessible to members of certain social classes (the educated and high-income earners, see Winter 2013, 2014), and by making “real” citizenship into something only individuals resident within the confines of Canadian geographical territory have (Winter 2013; Harder and Zhyznomirska 2012). Such measures ultimately risk creating a two-tiered citizenship, one for the native-born and one for the naturalized. This would result in a devaluation of citizenship as legal status and might make taking up citizenship less attractive and meaningful for immigrants.

Indeed, some studies point out that “good citizenship”, i.e. “feelings of personal duty to vote, pay taxes, join the military, and/or to volunteer in one’s community” (Raney and Berdahl 2009) is not just an immigration matter. The Environics (2012, 24) data may show that immigrants and native-born Canadians are just as likely to feel like “good citizens”, but only 76% of respondents (78% of native-born Canadians and 75% of naturalized Canadians) feel that way. Hence there is reason for concern that the native-born population may be just as much in need of efforts to encourage good citizenship as immigrants are, and that something in the Canadian institutional environment (rather than the personal traits of individuals) may be remiss in maintaining high levels of good citizenship among the national population.

Dual Citizenship and Attachment to Canada

There are no recent studies that indicate how dual citizenship affects new citizens’ attachment
to Canada. Based on our knowledge of policy developments and outcomes in Germany – a country that does not recognize dual citizenship as a general rule – we can say that the absence of this policy has a negative impact on the sense of belonging and civic participation of newcomers and second-generation descendants of immigrants. For first-generation immigrants to Germany, dual citizenship is only allowed for individuals holding citizenship of a European Union member state, and for individuals who face undue hardship in relinquishing their foreign citizenship: combined, these allowances mean that dual citizenship is tolerated in approximately 50% of cases (Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012:55). However, these exceptions rarely apply to members of Germany’s largest immigrant group: Turkish citizens. Indeed, as Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos (2012) state, “there is widespread agreement that for Turks, in particular, the requirement that immigrants give up their former citizenship when naturalizing constitutes a significant barrier [to their naturalizing].” For this group, exclusion from full legal membership in the national community is accompanied by symbolic exclusion from the national community in political discourses, with researchers, politicians, and media insisting that Turks (and Muslim immigrants in general) have long been retreating into “parallel societies” that threaten social cohesion (Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012:63).

In addition to the issue of dual citizenship for first-generation immigrants in Germany, the issue of dual citizenship for the second-generation descendants of immigrants – most born and raised in Germany – illustrates the negative consequences for sense of belonging of refusing to allow dual citizenship. While the German citizenship law was changed to allow second-generation immigrants dual citizenship, it came with restrictions (e.g. on parents’ length of stay and residence status), and with the proviso that affected persons choose either German or their foreign citizenship between the ages of 18 and 23. While the new coalition government is presently in the process of removing this proviso (again, only under certain provisions), potentially edging Germany closer to allowing dual citizenship than it has ever been, the conditionality of jus soli dual citizenship has been taken by many as yet another symbolic affront. These changes are coming at a time when the first cohort affected by the 1999 change is coming of age, so there has not been a lot of time to generate data. However, one evaluation by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Weinmann, Becher, and Babka von Gostomski 2012) shows that almost all young people in a position to choose are opting to maintain German citizenship. In this sense, the limited provisions for (temporary) dual citizenship are meeting the goal of bringing parts of the large and excluded Turkish-origin population into full legal citizenship. What remains, however, is a deep resentment and lingering
sense of symbolic exclusion, due to the length of time it took to reach this step, and the continued refusal of German authorities to allow dual citizenship outright without restrictions on national origin. As Bucerius (2012) poignantly shows in her qualitative study of disadvantaged second-generation Turkish and Moroccan youth in Germany, the symbolic damage done to these migrants’ sense of belonging is sizable and – at the moment – irreparable.
The field of citizenship studies as captured in this review of literature generated between 2009 and 2013 is transitioning from mainly economically driven analyses of the relationship between individual traits, citizenship acquisition, and outcomes, toward an analysis of how meso-level (community) and macro-level (state policy) factors affect naturalization dynamics. One line of inquiry in particular should be expanded on.

The line of inquiry that should be developed further is the work on citizenship policy indices. As Helbling (2013) outlines, nine independent integration and citizenship policy indices have been developed by different researchers since the mid-2000s, all of which vary according to the policy outputs and policy outcomes taken into account. Indices are an attractive instrument for empirical investigation because they are a parsimonious way of capturing multiple aspects of policies in a way that lends itself to cross-national, quantitative comparisons. In line with the renewed focus on macro-level determinants of naturalization and immigrant outcomes, indices offer the advantage of placing legislative frameworks (and, in some cases, implementation practices) at the centre of analyses. However, as Helbling (2013) also points out, the rapid growth in these empirical tools has left little room for methodological discussions of their validity and comparability. There is thus considerable room for refining these tools and applying them to different contexts, in an effort to increase understanding of what policy instruments are beneficial or detrimental to the policy outcomes set by a particular government, and whether policy instruments are consistently beneficial or detrimental across national contexts or interact with broader societal contexts in particular ways.

Improved research tools, like a well-defined citizenship index, could assist in addressing a number of gaps that this review identifies:

1. The impact of language, country knowledge and residence requirements on the outcomes of citizenship take-up.
2. The impact of rapid policy changes in citizenship and migration policy on citizenship take-up rates.
3. The determinants of eligible immigrants’ decision to apply for citizenship status.
4. The impact of settlement services, official language learning, and education and training on citizenship take-up rates and the decision to naturalize.
5. A comparison of the determinants of choosing to apply for citizenship and being successful once applied.

Surveys studies and qualitative methodologies (interviews, focus groups) could further assess:

1. Whether the impact of citizenship acquisition on indicators of belonging can be isolated.
2. The impact of awareness raising and citizenship education on citizenship attachment comparing immigrants and non-immigrants.
3. The impact of immigrants’ experiences of the process of citizenship acquisition on attachment and citizenship awareness.

Conclusion

This review of citizenship acquisition and outcomes of acquiring citizenship status for immigrants in Canada suggests that Canada has historically done an excellent job of integrating immigrants into full citizenship status. However, a comparison with other countries suggests that current trends in both immigration and citizenship policy risk undermining that achievement.

In terms of the outcomes for applicants and naturalized citizens, citizenship acquisition has a clear, positive net effect on immigrants’ income and labour market outcomes when naturalized immigrants are compared to non-naturalized immigrants with permanent residence status. However, this effect is smaller in Canada than in comparable OECD countries, likely as a result of Canada’s efforts to select immigrants for permanent settlement, who are supported by strong settlement services that help their participation in all aspects of life in Canada. Here, a shift away from permanent to temporary migration can have a negative impact on Canada’s ability to rely on immigration to strengthen Canada’s economy and society.

Concerns that the ease of obtaining citizenship devalues citizenship itself seem misplaced given that the data suggest that there is very little difference between non-naturalized immigrants, naturalized immigrants, and citizens by birth in terms of citizenship awareness and attachment to Canada. In the literature, citizenship awareness and attachment is often discussed in terms of the subjective feelings of belonging and acts of political and civic participation. Evidence from Europe suggest that making integration a condition of citizenship rather treating citizenship as an avenue towards full integration of immigrants in the receiving country has a negative impact on citizenship awareness and attachment.
References


Appendices
Appendix A: Significant Research in-progress

The UK citizenship Process: understanding immigrants’ experiences

Leah Bassel (PI), Sociology, University of Leicester, David Bartram (CoI), Barbara Misztal (CoI), Pierre Monforte (CoI), Jo Herbert (Research Associate), Kamran Khan (Research Associate).

Duration: September 2013-August 2016.

Funder: Economic and Social Research Council (ES/K010174/1), Amount awarded: £351,276.

This project analyses the ‘assimilationist turn’ in British immigration and integration policies, through a focus on immigrants’ lived experience of one of its principal instruments, the ‘citizenship process’. Studies to date have examined only one or two parts of the ‘citizenship process’, meaning the tests themselves, the citizenship ceremonies, the preparation courses many immigrants take beforehand, as well as the consequences of the tests for those to whom it is addressed. This project will adopt a more comprehensive approach to these issues, examining the lived experiences of the citizenship process as a whole via interviews with people about their experiences with preparation courses and their participation in the citizenship tests and ceremonies in Leicester and London. To analyse the effects of the process on the longer term, statistical analysis of survey data will also be undertaken. The overall goal is to learn about immigrants' perceptions and experiences of this process, to understand how it affects their sense of belonging, political participation and subjective well-being (happiness).

Integration Trajectories of Immigrant Families

Harald Bauder, PI, Ryerson University, hbauder@ryerson.ca

SSHRC Partnership Development Grant, 2013-2017

This partnership between academic researchers and community partners is spearheaded by the Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS). The overarching goal of the partnership is to explore the role families play in the integration trajectories of immigrants. In particular, the partnership addresses research questions, such as:

• How do all members of the family facilitate or impede the integration of immigrants?
• How immigrant families draw upon and contribute to diasporic communities and to the receiving society?
• What contributions do family members make to the immigrant family’s financial well-being and to the receiving country’s economy?
• What are the social, political, and economic costs and benefits of family members interacting
and relocating across international borders?
• What are the impacts of split families at the individual, group, and societal levels?
• How might the family context be mobilized on a practical level to facilitate the successful integration of newcomers?

One of the five themes of the research project is the policy context, which might be of particular interest to the question of linkages between integration and citizenship status.

See for more information: http://www.ryerson.ca/immigrant_families/index.html

**Migrant Women and Social Service Providers Responding to Changes in Immigration Policy**

Rupaleem Bhuyan, PI, University of Toronto, r.bhuyan@utoronto.ca)

SSHRC, Standard Research Grant and “Knowledge Mobilization” Grant; CERIS, Research Award; University of Toronto, Connaught New Researcher Award, 2010-2014.

Also known as the Migrant Mothers Project, this research uses participatory action research methods, interviews, community consultations, and policy analysis to understand how immigration policies are impacting immigrant rights and the capacity of social and health service providers to work with people who have precarious migratory status. In Phase I (2010-2012), in-depth interviews with 25 Spanish-speaking women from Latin America were conducted and a 12-week peer-led solidarity group was organized. Phase II (2013) involved seven community forums in different regions of Ontario and across Canada. In Phase III (2014), knowledge dissemination activities will be emphasized via digital stories, a policy report, and a national symposium.


**Negotiating the Boundaries of Rights and Membership” (SSHRC 2009-2013)**

Patricia Landolt, Sociology, University of Toronto and Luin Goldrin, Sociology, York University

This project (2011-13) examines the ways that the Ontario public education system practices inclusion and exclusion in the context of encounters with precarious status migrants. Questions that organize the research include: What is the role of school board workers (i.e administrators within and outside of specific schools, teachers, guidance councillors, frontline staff) in regulating access to schooling? What are the narratives and rules they invoke to frame their practices? What is the role of actors outside of the school systems (e.g. community advocates, legal aid workers) in negotiating access? What networks and resources do these actors and institutions bring to bear in these negotiations? Mapping the networked encounters between
different actors and institutions will reveal how the boundary between citizens and non-citizens is produced and contested.

The Daily Lives of Children Growing Up in Mexican Immigrant Households

Joanna Dreby (Sociology, University at Albany (SUNY, USA))

- This study is a three-year ethnographic study funded by the Foundation for Child Development that explores the daily life experiences of young children ages growing up in Mexican immigrant households. It involves ethnographic interviews and participant-observation in two social settings, one--in Ohio-- which new immigrants are dispersed in the community and another--in New Jersey--where they are concentrated. The study focuses on children’s experiences in immigrant families with varying legal statuses, including those who have experienced a family member’s deportation. The study reveals how two main features of the contemporary immigrant experience—legality and new destination settlement patterns-- have consequences for young children, in terms of their access to social services, peer group affiliations, identity, and their early educational experiences.
Appendix B: Key Research Institutions and Researchers

Research Institutions

CANADA

CERIS – Bridging migration research, policy, and practice

CERIS (Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement) was established as one of the Metropolis centres of excellence in 1996. Since its beginning, the centre has been a partnership of Toronto’s three universities (Ryerson University, University of Toronto, and York University) and three major community organizations (Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants, Social Planning Toronto, and United Way Toronto), with representation from the federal, provincial, and municipal levels of government. With a renewed emphasis on bridging migration research, policy, and practice in the post-Metropolis era, CERIS serves as a knowledge exchange hub and network for Ontario’s researchers, policymakers, and practitioners dealing with immigration and settlement issues. It also remains engaged in collaborative research that has relevance to the lives of immigrants, refugees, and other migrant groups. The CERIS website houses an extensive body of research in the forms of Working Papers, Policy Matters, Research Summaries, and a Virtual Library.

Examples of Recent Publications

Bhuyan, Rupaleem, Bethany Osborne, and Janet Cruz. “Unprotected and Unrecognized: The Ontological Insecurity of Migrants Who Are Denied Protection from Domestic Violence in Their Home Countries and as Refugee Claimants in Canada” CERIS Working Paper, No. 96 (February 2013)


Contact
Adnan Türegün, Director
Room 801, Kaneff Tower, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3; Phone: 416-736-5223; Fax: 416-736-5688; Email: turegun@yorku.ca; Website: http://www.ceris.metropolis.net/

Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP)

Founded in 1972, the IRPP is an independent, national, bilingual, and non-profit organization. It seeks to improve public policy in Canada by generating research, providing insight, and sparking debate on current and emerging policy issues facing Canadians and their
governments. Its independence is assured by an endowment fund, to which federal and provincial governments and the private sector contributed in the early 1970s.

Examples of Recent Publications

Elke Winter, “Becoming Canadia: Making Sense of Recent Changes to Citizenship Rules” (January 16, 2014)


Contact
F. Leslie Seidle, Research Director
200-1470 Peel Street, Montreal, QC H3A 1T1; Phone: 514-985-2461; lseidle@irpp.org;
http://www.irpp.org/.

International Migration Research Centre (IMRC)

The IMRC is a research centre whose mandate is to serve as a focal point for debate, research, policy analysis, and proposal development related to international migration and mobility at the global, national, and regional scale. Activities conducted under this mandate include sponsoring research, assisting with the development of research proposals, conducting seminars, organizing and conducting conferences, and linking members of the business community, community organizations, and governmental actors with academic scholars and scholarship.

Examples of Recent Publications

Margaret Walton-Roberts, Jennifer Guo, Keegan Williams, and Jenna Hennebry, “Immigration Policy Changes and Entry to Practice Routes for Internationally Educated Nurses (IENs),” Knowledge synthesis report (March 2014).

Contact
Jenna Hennebry, Director
67 Erb Street West, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON N2L 6C2; Phone: 226-772-3139; Fax: 226-772-3002; Email: jhennebry@wlu.ca; Website: http://imrc.ca/.

Maytree

Maytree is a private Canadian charitable foundation established in 1982, committed to reducing poverty and inequality in Canada and to building strong civic communities. It seeks to accomplish its objectives by identifying, supporting, and funding ideas, as well as leaders and leading organizations that have the capacity to make change and advance the common good. Its Integration and Diversity Programs include Assisting Local Leaders with Immigrant
Employment Solutions (ALLIES), Cities of Migration, and DiverseCity – The Greater Toronto Leadership Program.

Examples of Recent Publications


Contact
Ratna Omidvar, President
804-170 Bloor Street West, Toronto, ON M5S 1T9; Phone: 416-944-2627; Email: romidvar@maytree.com; Website: http://maytree.com/.

Metropolis

Metropolis at Carleton University continues to support the longstanding mandate of the International Metropolis Project to enhance policy through research in the field of migration. With the other Metropolis offices in Amsterdam, Seoul, and Manila, Metropolis contributes to the global migration debate through research. It will continue the expansion of Metropolis’s international network and will offer research-based analysis and advice to organizations in this field of endeavour throughout Canada and the world.

Examples of Recent Publications

N/A

Contact
Howard Duncan, Executive Head
Room 1120, Dunton Tower, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6; Phone: 613-520-2600, ext. 3106; Email: Howard.Duncan@carleton.ca; Website: http://www.carleton.ca/metropolis/.

Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS)

The RCIS aims to be a leader in the transdisciplinary exploration of international migration, integration, and diaspora and refugee studies. In addition to supporting research in these areas, the centre’s mission includes mentoring students and consolidating Ryerson’s reputation as the pre-eminent site of knowledge development and exchange with governments, community organizations, and other academics. The overall goal of the RCIS is to advance policy-related research and scholarship in the areas of immigration and settlement studies, both nationally and internationally.
Examples of Recent Publications


Contact
Harald Bauder, Academic Director
620 Jorgenson Hall, Ryerson University, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto, ON M5B 2K3; Phone: 416-979-5000, ext. 7193; Email: hbauder@geography.ryerson.ca; Website: http://www.ryerson.ca/rcis/.

Western Centre for Research on Migration and Ethnic Relations

Interdisciplinary research conducted by members of the Western Centre for Research on Migration and Ethnic Relations informs public policy and practice that facilitate the well-being of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Canada and internationally. The Centre provides training opportunities for students beyond the borders of their own discipline and internationally, and connects academic researchers with policymakers and community stakeholders.

Examples of Recent Publications


Contact
Victoria M. Esses, Director
Social Science Centre, Western University, London, ON N6A 5C2; Phone: 519-661-2111, ext. 84650; Fax: 519-661-3961; Email: vesse@uwo.ca; Website: http://www.ssc.uwo.ca/MER/MERcentre/.

INTERNATIONAL

Centre On Migration, Policy And Society (Compas) At Oxford University
Research cluster on Citizenship and Belonging http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/?id=544
The relationship between mobility, citizenship and the numerous ways in which people ‘belong’ forms the basis of all work within this cluster. Citizenship is a legal status giving a right to enter, remain and not be deported from a state. It describes a relation to a state and to other citizens. Citizenship also indicates a subjective feeling of identity, and social relations of belonging to a ‘nation’ to a state and to a community. Increasing mobility and shifts in relations between states are opening up new spaces of contestation around migration and membership and between migration, legal status and rights. This research cluster addresses the (in)congruencies between citizenship and belonging and between nation and state, and addresses the consequences in theory and in practice.

Current Research Projects:
- Balancing Citizenship of Insiders and Outsiders
- Early Legal Advice for Protection Applicants
- Imagined Immigration: The Different Meanings of "Immigrants" in Public Opinion and Policy Debates in Britain
- Migration in the Media and Public Opinion in Britain
- Migration Observatory Scotland Project
- Signals from the majority – paradoxes of integration
- Tried and Trusted? A project on Assisted Voluntary Return
- Us and Them? The dangerous politics of immigration controls
- Testing for Deliberation
- Insiders and Outsiders: barriers to EU Citizenship


**Mission**
Open and inclusive societies

**Vision**
MPG wants to see open and inclusive societies in which all members - those with and without an immigrant background - have equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities and a commitment to contribute to the economic, social, cultural and civic life of our diverse societies.

**Mission**
MPG’s mission is to contribute to lasting and positive change resulting in open and inclusive societies by stimulating well-informed European debate and action on migration, equality and diversity, and enhancing European co-operation between and amongst governmental agencies, civil society organisations and the private sector.
We articulate this mission through four primary activities focused on harnessing the advantages of migration, equality and diversity and responding effectively to their challenges:
- Gathering, analysing and sharing information
• Creating opportunities for dialogue and mutual learning
• Mobilising and engaging stakeholders in policy debates
• Establishing, inspiring and managing expert networks

Researchers

Bridget Anderson (Professor of Migration and Citizenship and Deputy Director of the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at Oxford University, UK [Bridget.anderson@compas.ox.ac.uk]): citizenship, nationalism, immigration enforcement (including ‘trafficking’), and low waged labour, migration and the state. She has worked closely with migrants' organisations, trades unions and legal practitioners at local, national and international level. http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/people/staff/bridget-anderson/

Rainer Bauböck (European University Institute, Florence, Italy, rainer.baubock@eui.eu): Normative Political Theory and Comparative Research on Democratic Citizenship, European Integration, Migration, Nationalism and Minority Rights

Harald Bauder (Department of Geography, Ryerson University, hbauder@ryerson.ca): Political economy of immigration and settlement, labour market experiences of immigrants, and immigration discourses in Canada and Germany.

Rupaleem Bhuyan (Factor-Inwentash Faculty of Social Work, University of Toronto, r.bhuyan@utoronto.ca): Interpretive policy analysis and community-based participatory action research to address the socio-cultural and political context of domestic violence, migration, citizenship, and social rights.

Scott Blinder (Director Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, scot.blinder@compas.ox.ac.uk): public opinion toward migration, multiculturalism, and related political issues

Irene Bloemraad (Department of Sociology, University of California Berkeley, USA, bloemr@berkeley.edu): Immigration, political sociology, race & ethnicity, social movements, nationalism, research methods, Canada

Joanna Dreby (Department of Sociology, SUNY Albany, USA, jdreby@albany.edu): immigration, transnationalism, citizenship and legal status, gender, ethnography and qualitative methods

Thomas Faist (Department of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, Thomas.faist@uni-bielefeld.de): transnationality, dual citizenship, social inequality
Matthew Gibney (Associate Professor (Reader) of Politics and Forced Migration at the University of Oxford, Deputy Director of the Refugee Studies Centre, matthew.gibney@qeh.ox.ac.uk): asylum, deportation, citizenship, globalization, and statelessness

Luin Goldring (Department of Sociology, York University, goldring@yorku.ca): Immigration, citizenship and non-citizenship, precarious work.

Randall Hansen (Political Science and CERES, University of Toronto, Canada, r.hansen@utoronto.ca): immigration and integration, citizenship, 20th century European history, public policy, global governance

Lois Harder (Political Science, University of Alberta, Canada, lharder@ualberta.ca): Gender & politics, Canadian political economy, Canada-US comparative social policy, citizenship & belonging

Marc Helbling (Berlin Social Science Center, WZB, marc.helbling@wzb.eu): immigration and citizenship politics, nationalism, xenophobia and islamophobia, Islam in Europe

Jenna Hennebry (Department of Communication Studies, Wilfrid Laurier University, jhennebry@wlu.ca): Comparative international research on mobility and migration governance with an emphasis on foreign worker programs.

Thomas Huddleston (Migration Policy Group, Belgium, Diversity & Integration Programme): European and national integration policies, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)

Engin Isin (Professor of Citizenship, Politics & International Studies, Open University, UK): citizenship

Thomas Janoski (Department of Sociology, University of Kentucky, USA, tjanos@email.uky.edu): political economy and unemployment, citizenship and civil society, lean production and the sociology of work, the welfare state, volunteering and social policy, immigration and naturalization, complex organizations and industrial relations, and comparative and historical methodology

Christian Joppke (Sociology, University of Bern, Switzerland, joppke@soz.unibe.ch): citizenship, migration, religion, secularism

Ruud Koopmans (Sociology, Humboldt University, Berlin and Director, Berlin Social Science Centre [WZB], Germany, ruud.koopmans@wzb.eu): immigration and integration policies, European integration, evolutionary sociology, social movements, right-wing radicalism
Anna Korteweg (Sociology, University of Toronto, Canada, anna.korteweg@utoronto.ca): citizenship and integration, intersectionality, gender, religion, welfare state and social inequality

Peter Kivisto (Sociology, Augustana College, PeterKivisto@augustana.edu): immigration, ethnic and racial studies, citizenship

Will Kymlicka (Department of Philosophy, Queen’s University, kymlicka@queensu.ca): Multiculturalism, welfare state, and social integration.

Patricia Landolt (Sociology, University of Toronto, Canada, landolt@utsc.utoronto.ca): social citizenship, politics and policy in the global city, Latin American immigrants in Canada, race and ethnicity in Canada

Michael Lister (Politics, Oxford Brookes University, UK, mlister@brookes.ac.uk): Citizenship, Political Participation, Comparative Welfare State analysis, (New) Institutionalism and State theory

Audrey Macklin (Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canada, audrey.macklin@utoronto.ca): administrative law, feminist analysis of law, immigration and citizenship law, international human rights law

Ines Michalowski (Berlin Social Science Center, WZB, Germany, ines.michalowski@wzb.eu): military and religious minorities, integration policies, citizenship

Mireille Paquet (Political Science, Concordia University, Montreal, mireille.paquet@concordia.ca): Public policy and public administration, immigration and integration (policies and processes), federalism as well as Canadian and Québec Politics.

Jeffrey Reitz (Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, jeffrey.reitz@utoronto.ca): Social, economic, and political experiences of immigrant and ethnic populations; and experience of Muslim immigration in France, Quebec, and Canada.

Patrick Simon (Institut national d’études demographiques, SciencesPo, Paris, simon@ined.fr): discrimination, ethno-racial statistical categorizations, social trajectories of immigrants and racial ethnic minorities, residential segregation, and urban politics

Daiva Stasiulis (Sociology and Ant, Carleton University, Ottawa, daiva.stasiulis@carleton.ca): Global migration, transnationalism and diaspora studies; citizenship studies and multiple citizenship; intersectionality and social inequality; critical race studies; multiculturalism; sociology of emotions
Alex Street (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Goettingen Germany, street@mmg.mmp.de): citizenship and naturalization, political participation, democracy

Myer Siemiatycki (Department of Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson University, msiemiatycki@politics.ryerson.ca): Canadian politics, immigration policy, labour policy, municipal politics, and voting behaviour among ethnic groups.

Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos (Political Science, University of Toronto, t.triadafilopoulos@utoronto.ca): immigration and citizenship policy in Europe and North America

Elke Winter (Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Ottawa, elke.winter@uottawa.ca): Migration, ethnicity, multiculturalism, and national identity.

Matthew Wright (Department of Government, American University, USA, mwright@american.edu): the causes and implications of political identity; immigration, assimilation, and citizenship policies; the politics of ethnic diversity; national identity and patriotism; religion and politics; political culture; social capital, civic engagement, and trust, and U.S. voting behavior

Nira Yuval-Davis (Centre for Research on Migration, Refugees, and Belonging, University of East London, n.yuval-davis@uel.ac.uk): theoretical and empirical aspects of intersected nationalisms, racisms, fundamentalisms, citizenships, identities, belonging/s and gender relations in Britain & Europe, Israel and other Settler Societies.
Appendix C: Annotated Bibliography

Prepared by: Jennifer Elrick, Salina Abji, and Paulina Garcia Del Moral


**Purpose:** This is an 85-page policy paper analyzing the changes to Canada’s refugee and immigration policies between 2008-2012. The authors express concerns over (1) the scope and pace of changes, (2) the overall negative potential impact of the changes, as well as (3) the problematic processes through which changes are being introduced (i.e. the increase in ministerial powers and the “retreat from traditional democratic processes” as well a lack of evidence-based policy making).

**Methods:** Policy analysis. The authors also analyze the federal government’s rationale for the changes based on a review of news releases, speeches, and announcements.

**Findings:** Some changes were seen as positive. For example, increased protections for live-in caregivers, transition to PR status for eligible students and temporary workers etc. However, the authors caution that positive outcomes depend on how the changes are implemented (2).

Other changes are analyzed as having a potential negative impact on Canada’s future, particularly when viewed as part of an overall cumulative effect. In the 4.5 year period of the report, significant changes were introduced across major forms of entry (i.e. economic, family reunification, and humanitarian) and the proportions have shifted from more permanent humanitarian toward more temporary foreign workers. The report goes into great detail into the specific changes to each entry class and the potential mismatch with Canada’s values/interests (see more below).

Significantly, the report shows that there has been a major shift in powers and roles, with considerable discretion afforded to the Minister (rather than legislative channels) along with the use of omnibus and budget bills to push through changes. Also, immigration is a shared responsibility between federal and provincial governments under the constitution. However, there has been more unilateral decision-making on immigration policy at the federal level (causing strains with provincial governments), combined with a devolution of settlement and immigration services to the provinces and municipalities. In Ontario, there has been significant de-funding/ decreased funding to agencies that provide settlement services (done without consultation - $32M funding cut in 2012-2013). As a result, there is considerable geographic variation in programming for newcomers, adding to disparities among migrants (16).

There has also been a devolution of immigrant selection to employers (for temporary foreign workers) and post-secondary institutions (for international students). While the authors identify some positives to this, they caution that the interests of employers/institutions are not always aligned with national interests, and so must be carefully managed (19).

**Significance:** There are three major areas where the authors identify a mis-match between the changes to Canada’s immigration system, and the national interests/values of Canada. The first
is the federal government’s focus on short-term labour market gains. This not only ignores the direct and indirect contributions made by other classes (e.g. parents, grandparents) but also overlooks the long-term interests of Canada for “people who will stay and contribute” (60). Second, the authors identify a lack of overall policy coherence, evidence, consistency, and predictability of the system (62). Instead, Canada needs evidence-based policy making that includes shared decision-making and consistency among provinces and the federal government. Thirdly, the authors raise concerns about the weakening of the democratic process and the overall less welcoming environment for newcomers and residents in Canada.


Purpose: Since direct comparisons between countries on the effect of citizenship are rare, this working paper seeks “to analyse the citizenship effect on both employment probabilities and the relative income of work of immigrants in two countries, Canada and Sweden” (p. 1). The research question guiding the research asks: “Is there a citizenship effect and if any, in which country is it that we find the largest effect and for which immigrant groups?” (p. 1).

Methods: The study uses quantitative methods. It justifies the comparison between Canada and Sweden given these country’s high levels of immigrant intake; the presence of a large set of policies aimed at enhancing immigrant integration; and comprehensive datasets. The study uses the Canadian Census of 2006, containing information for approximately 20 percent of individuals, and the 2006 Swedish STATIV, the statistical integration database held by Statistics Sweden, which contains information for all legal residents. Both datasets include information on an individual’s age, sex, marital status, number of children in the household, educational level, employment status, country of birth, years since migration, annual income of work, and citizenship status. Bevelander and Pendakur sample people age 25-64 “because [they] want to concentrate on people who have finished their studies and are likely to be active in the labour-force” (p. 5). The study runs both OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) Regressions to measure the “clean effect” of citizenship on the probability of employment and annual earnings. By a “clean effect” Bevelander and Pendakur use a definition of citizenship “as a product of whether or not an immigrant is eligible to acquire citizenship” (p. 5), seeking thus to isolate its effect from its correlation with other factors. Bevelander and Pendakur run IV regressions constructing a model in which all variables interact with country of birth for each of 11 place of birth groups. “Within these regressions, [they] include a variable that identifies the number of people in the municipality who share the same place of birth with the respondent. In this way we can assess the degree to which the size of the ethnic enclave in a given city affects employment and earnings of co-ethnic members” (p. 6). In addition, Bevelander and Pendakur take into consideration Canada’s and Sweden’s different citizenship regimes involving jus sanguini and jus soli; thus “instrumenting” citizenship. The models include 14 variables ranging from contextual variables, demographic variables, socio-economic variables and schooling, country of origin, and control variables. The main explanatory variable is whether or not the immigrant is naturalized (pp. 5-6).

Findings: Bevelander and Pendakur emphasize the significance of citizenship acquisition for immigrant integration, especially their integration into the labour market (p. 2). Although both
Canada and Sweden have very high naturalization rates, these vary by source country (p. 3). Barriers related to this factor may affect immigrant integration into the labour market, yet citizenship acquisition is correlated with a higher employment integration (p. 9). Overall, Canada has a higher citizenship acquisition in comparison to Sweden, with almost three-quarters of immigrants having citizenship compared to almost two-thirds of Swedish immigrants (p. 4). According to Bevelander and Pendakur, “the most important thing to note […] is the substantial variance in employment probabilities across groups and citizenship. In general it appears that the impact of citizenship on employment is lower in Canada than in Sweden, however there are differences by place of birth” (p. 9). Bevelander and Pendakur also find that there are differences in earnings in relation to place of birth after naturalization (p. 9). Ultimately, they find that “with the exception of Scandinavian immigrants in Sweden, citizenship acquisition has a positive impact on employment for all immigrant groups. This is particularly the case for non-EU/non-North American immigrants in Sweden and European, Latin American and African and Chinese immigrants in Canada,” although the size of the co-ethnic population has a positive impact for many immigrant groups—as the co-ethnic population increases, the probability of being employed also increases (p. 19). They note that the results for earnings are similar: “Citizenship acquisition has a positive and significant effect on earnings for immigrants in both Canada and Sweden. However, depending on the country of origin, the impact of citizenship on earnings can be stronger in Sweden. Of interest is the fact that citizenship acquisition appears to be more important for women than for men. This is true both for employment and earnings” (p. 19).

Significance: “Looking at citizenship and employment from a policy perspective, what are the implications of tightening up citizenship acquisition requirements? Our contention is that given citizenship’s apparent link to improved employment and earnings prospects, tightening up citizenship regulations may result in decreased opportunities for immigrants in receiving countries. This means, in turn, that stricter citizenship regulations could have the effect of actually increasing social welfare costs—an effect neither intended nor desirable” (p. 19).


Region: Canada

Purpose: To evaluate the claim that Discover Canada is a document imbued with a Conservative sense of national identity, i.e. contains content marked by three characteristics: “unabashed patriotism, pride in the armed forces, and support for the rule of law”, and that is thus seeks to “conservatize the country” (p. 21) and win more votes for the Conservative party.

Methods: Comprehensive content analysis of the Canadian government’s citizenship publications to date.

Findings: “Recent arguments that the Conservative government of Stephen Harper has politicized these efforts by injecting deliberately partisan considerations into one of Canada’s most widely read public documents, the study guide for Canadian citizenship, are more alarmist than they are convincing for two reasons. First, the vast majority of the changes to Discover Canada, which have allegedly conservatized the text to the delight of Conservative supporters have in essence restored ideas first expressed by the Liberal governments of William Lyon
Mackenzie King and Pierre Elliott Trudeau […] Second, and more important, even if one concludes that Discover Canada is a conservative document, there is little in the text that should incite Canadian voters to choose the Conservative Party over any other. Just like the Chrétien Liberals never held a monopoly on support for peace and sustainable development, it is difficult to understand what gives the Harper Conservatives a monopoly on responsible citizenship or military heroism” (p.32).

Significance: This article shows that the content of national identity expressed in the Canadian government’s citizenship publications over the last decade is not value-neutral, and that this lack of value-neutrality has been shared by Conservative and Liberal administrations alike.


Purpose: The aim of this chapter is to expand research on the factors that determine naturalization among immigrants in the United States by taking into consideration characteristics of immigrants as well as their country of origin. As such, the authors seek “to provide a theoretical framework and quantitative overview of the incidence of naturalization among the foreign born in the United States” (p. 92).

Methods: Two-step quantitative analysis from the 2000 US Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), 1 percent file. First step – cross-tabulations to establish the variation in incidence of citizenship in the United States across birthplace group and according to other key personal characteristics (p. 97). “The cross-tabulations were limited to the foreign born in the US Census aged 25–64 years who arrived in the United States as adults (i.e., aged 18 or more years). This age bracket covers the groups with most “choice” with respect to the citizenship decision” (p. 99). Second step – multivariate statistical analysis (OLS and probit) of the same data, but separate analysis for males and females. A wider set of individual characteristics is included and information about the origin countries of the immigrants in the United States is liked to these data (p. 113). Individual characteristics: gender, educational attainment, age, years since migration, service in the US Armed Forces, family structure, proficiency in speaking English, region of residence (southern states, metropolitan area), whether the immigrant lived abroad five years ago, marital status, presence of children, and, where relevant, spouse’s educational attainment and whether the spouse is foreign born (p. 105). Country of origin variables: measures of political rights (PR), civil liberties (CL), GDP, economic freedom (EF), majority language concentration (as a measure of group identity), selectivity in migration and return migration (geographic distance and Sojourner Index), and linguistic distance (from English), in addition to geographic distance, recognition of dual-citizenship in country of origin, the status of English as an official language in the country of origin.

Findings: The cross-tabulation analysis of the 2000 US Census revealed that variation in the incidence of citizenship in the US is significantly affected by birthplace group, by year of arrival, proficiency in English, marital status, presence of children, and, where relevant, spouse’s educational attainment and whether the spouse is foreign born (p. 105). Country of origin variables: measures of political rights (PR), civil liberties (CL), GDP, economic freedom (EF), majority language concentration (as a measure of group identity), selectivity in migration and return migration (geographic distance and Sojourner Index), and linguistic distance (from English), in addition to geographic distance, recognition of dual-citizenship in country of origin, the status of English as an official language in the country of origin.
requirements are lower. Thus, naturalization rates increase with the immigrant’s level of schooling, duration in the United States, proficiency in English, and service in the US Armed Forces, but are lower among sojourners. Spouse and family characteristics also matter. Naturalization rates are also higher the less attractive is the prospect of returning to the country of origin. They are higher the lower are the PR, CL, EF, and GDP per capita in the origin, the further the origin is from the United States and the less to and fro migration between the origin and the United States. Naturalization is also higher if the origin country permits dual citizenship. Overall, the individual’s own characteristics are more important than country of origin characteristics for explaining differences in naturalization rates. Limiting features of the analyses, however, are that there are no data in the Census on the respondent’s visa history (i.e., type of visa obtained and when he or she became a permanent resident alien after entering the United States) or among those naturalized, the year in which this occurred. The analysis of the naturalization decision would be greatly enhanced if in the future data sets on immigrants, or the population as a whole, included information on visa status at entry, visa history in the United States, and year of naturalization” (p. 122).

Significance: “The findings in this paper have implications for how the United States could increase the rate of naturalization among its immigrants without relaxing naturalization requirements. Given that the United States allows dual nationality, it is in a position to encourage other countries where this is prohibited (or where certain rights in the origin are lost if an emigrant becomes a citizen of the destination) to do the same. Changes in US immigration policy that encourage the migration of the more highly educated, those more proficient in English, those who bring their spouse and minor children with them, and those who are expected to stay a longer period of time (as distinct from sojourners) would enhance the overall naturalization rate. Moreover, citizenship rates could be increased by encouraging immigrants to attend “Americanization” classes where they would learn English and US history, government, civics, and culture. Encouraging immigrant enlistment in the US Armed Forces, in part through the deployment of recruiting officers to secondary schools and neighborhoods with a high proportion of immigrants would further enhance naturalization rates” p. 122).


Region: 15 countries in Europe

Purpose: To “test a series of hypotheses on the determinants of citizenship status derived from the social science literature on immigrant naturalization” (p. 391). Takes three broad types of determinants into consideration: macro-level factors in the receiving country (naturalization & ius soli policies, economic strength, cultural bent of naturalization tests, which may negatively affect Muslims, e.g. in the Netherlands – p. 398); macro-level factors in the sending country (acceptance of dual citizenship, level of economic development, political stability, membership in EU/EFTA, former colony status); and individual-level factors (language, education, employment,

Methods: A logistic multi-level analysis of a pooled data set on first- and second-generation immigrants resident in 15 European countries. The article uses the second and third waves of the European Social Survey (ESS), collected in 2004-5 and 2006-7, respectively. The authors use 15 of the 24 countries covered by the ESS: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland,
Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. The dependent variable is destination country citizenship; I won’t outline the other variables here, but note that one of the independent measures representing citizenship policy is a subset of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) that captures “access to nationality” (p. 399). Policy indices (Banting, Kymlicka, Helbling, etc.) are a hot topic right now.

Findings: 1) Citizenship policy in the receiving country matters for naturalization, especially for first-generation immigrants with more than 5 but fewer than 20 years of residence. 2) Dual citizenship policy in the country of origin had a negative effect. 3) Cultural and socioeconomic conditions in countries of origin are important. Being from a politically unstable country makes immigrants more likely to naturalize, being from an EU15/EFTA country makes it less likely. 4) Individual factors matter and explain that greatest amount of variation in tendencies to naturalize (“From a democratic perspective that finding may be seen as encouraging in the sense that it matters less where you come from, or where you are, than who and what you are” p. 408). “We find that adult second-generation immigrants and first-generation immigrants who have more than 20 years of residence, immigrants with one parent born in the destination country and retired workers and persons speaking the host country language at home are more likely to be a citizen of their country of residence We find no significant effects for education and employment. With regard to cultural factors, we do find that second-generation Muslim immigrants are less likely to have host country citizenship than comparable non-Muslim immigrants (including immigrants who adhere to non-Christian religions such as Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism), although we find no significant effect of adherence to Islam for the first generation.” (p. 408). 5) Data issues: survey data (here) versus census data (North America), see p. 408.

Significance: 1) Authors tout the study as the first one to examine systematically explanations for naturalization in a European context, using approaches and theories developed in reference to North American immigrant-receiving countries. 2) Shows importance of legal/institutional contexts of both the receiving and the sending countries, and thus echoes Bauboeck’s (2010) call to consider the transnational dimension of citizenship acquisition. 3) Shows strength and weakness of EU citizenship: weakness, because policies are still divergent, strength because having it is valuable enough to make naturalization in another EU country unnecessary.


Region: Canada and USA

Purpose: To examine what Canadians think it means to be a good Canadian citizen.

Methods: Survey, based on telephone interviews (conducted in November/December 2011) with a representative sample of 2,376 Canadian resident (18 and over). Sampling frame: all Canadian households with an operating landline. Sampling was stratified to took into account smaller regional, urban, and permanent resident sub-groups. Comparative data was collected on the United States population, based on a telephone survey conducted in January 2012 among a representative sample of 1,014 persons (18 and over). The sampling frame was continental US households with a landline (764) or cell-phone only service (250).
Findings: 1) “Canadians believe being a good citizen means more than having a passport and obeying the law. Just as important are having an active commitment to the community and being accepting of others who are different” (p. 3). 2) Canadians believe that everyone – regardless of where they are born – can be a good citizen. They expect newcomers to adapt to become good citizens, but many also believe society needs to play a greater role in supporting that process” (p. 3). 3) Most Canadians are comfortable with the current rules, responsibilities and requirements surrounding legal citizenship, including those pertaining to dual citizenship and living abroad” (p. 3). “There is, however, an underlying concern about citizens who do not have a history of residency in Canada and take advantage of their status to access benefits without paying taxes or otherwise contributing to the country” (p. 4). 4) Canadian-born and foreign-born citizens share a remarkably similar vision of how to be a good citizen in this country. While the point at which foreign-born Canadians start to feel like good citizens varies, lack of English or French makes this process more challenging” (p. 4). “…a greater proportion [of foreign-born Canadians] felt fully like a citizen the moment they arrived in the country” (p. 4). 5) “…there is essentially a consensus among Canadians that good citizenship means treating men and women equally (95%)” (p. 6). This comes in ahead of following national laws. 6) “…there is widespread support for a broader requirement that citizens abide by certain Canadian values (70%). While the survey did not define which values would apply, Canadians’ views on what makes a good citizen (e.g. gender equity, respect for others and environmental responsibility) are indicators of the types of values to which they are likely referring” (p. 18). 7) Dual citizenship: 71% think that Canadians should be allowed to hold dual citizenship, while 23% do not. The most important reason given for allowing dual citizenship was to “maintain sense of belonging to both countries” (p. 20). By far the most important reason given for not allowing it was “lack of loyalty/commitment” (48%) (p. 21). 8) Residency requirements: despite support for dual citizenship and Canadians being allowed to live abroad (64%), a narrow majority (52%) believes that residency requirements should be placed on citizens abroad (p. 23). 9) Only 76% of respondents (78% of Canadian-born and 75% of born abroad) feel like “good citizens”, i.e. someone who is an active member of their community, province, territory or country” (p. 24). 9) Respondents experienced the naturalization process differently: 59% found it “very easy”, 22% “somewhat easy”. Immigrants from Europe found it easier than immigrants from Asia or the Middle East (62% versus 48%). Immigrants with English or French as a native language found it easier than allophones (70% versus 51%) (p. 26).

Significance: 1) The articles on the UK (contrasting focus groups in the US, Canada, and New Zealand with others) shows that lack of language ability and difficulty feeling belonging is not always a matter of an immigrant not understanding or communicating, but of perceived discrimination directed at strong accents, etc. So if “overcoming language barriers is seen as the greatest challenge facing newcomers who follow in [foreign-born Canadians’] footsteps” (p. 4), the concern should lie not just with language acquisition (as correcting a ‘deficit’ in immigrant human capital), but also on processes of discrimination in the implementation of citizenship policy. 2) The result that many foreign-born citizens felt fully like members after arrival in Canada points to the relative importance of immigration over citizenship policy in creating an attachment to the country of reception (a point made elsewhere by Reitz and Triadafilopoulos). Policy makers should thus also keep an eye on changes in access to permanent residence status (in light of the increasing move toward TFW and two-step immigration programs) if they are concerned about citizenship outcomes. 3) While only 6% of naturalized Canadian citizens reported acquiring citizens for the passport (p. 26), the articles on the UK are a cautionary tale of how this could change if the securitization/values tone of citizenship discourse begins to change. 4) The finding that almost 20% of the population does not feel that they are good citizens, in the broader sense of being participants in a political community is interesting –
suggesting that perhaps we should be less concerned about immigrants vs. non-immigrants and more concerned about the level of active participation in Canadian society in general.


Region: Canada

Purpose: To answer the following questions: 1) “How do recent immigrants, earlier immigrants and the Canadian-born compare in the degree to which they identify/associate with various collective identities (i.e. the world, North America, Canada, province/region and local community)?” 2) “Are the Canadian-born more likely to identify as Canadian citizens than earlier and recent immigrants?” 3) “Are there variables that are associated with an individual’s likelihood of identifying as a citizen of Canada?” 4) “Do individuals who strongly identify with other collective identities (e.g. world citizen and local community) demonstrate a greater likelihood of identifying as a citizen of Canada?” (p. 1).

Methods: The study uses data from the fifth wave (2006) of the World Values Survey (WVS) to analyze individuals’ collective identities (citizen of the world, North America, Canada, province/region and local community). It compares Canadian-born with recent immigrants and established immigrants. Ordered logistic regression analyses were used. “Recent immigrants, earlier immigrants and the Canadian-born are asked whether they strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement: “I see myself as … a citizen of the world/a citizen of North America/a citizen of Canada as a whole/a citizen of my province or region/a member of my local community”. The responses of the three population groups are examined to see if and how patterns of identification compare across population groups” (p. ii).

Findings: 1) “Recent immigrants, earlier immigrants and the Canadian-born collectively express high levels of positive identification as citizens of Canada as a whole, as citizens of their province/region, and as members of their local community. However, when looking at differences between the three groups, results show a decreased tendency for recent immigrants to „strongly agree” with the various Canadian collective identities” (p. ii). 2) “Earlier immigrant and recent immigrant respondents who strongly identify with their community are significantly more likely to identify as citizens of Canada. This suggests that micro-community identification may play a significant role in influencing macro-community identification” (p. ii). 3) “For recent immigrants, race1 is a significant variable which appears to have an impact upon response patterns. The Black population is found to express the lowest rates of identifying as a citizen of Canada and as a citizen of their province” (p. ii). 4) “Results suggest that income status does not appear to be associated with the degree to which the Canadian-born, earlier immigrant, and recent immigrant respondents identify as citizens of Canada. This finding suggests that economic integration may not play an integral role in the psychological integration of immigrants to their national community” (p. ii). 5) “Finally, the study provides preliminary evidence to suggest that there is no contradiction between identifying as a citizen of the world and identifying as a citizen of Canada. In fact, when looking at the total WVS population, the results show that respondents who identify as a world citizen are significantly more likely to positively identify as a citizen of Canada” (p. ii).
Significance: 1) If immigrants generally identify with Canada but recent immigrants are less likely to “strongly agree”, then this might be a warning sign that the toughening rhetoric around citizens of convenience, etc., is having an impact. 2) The link between community identification and identification with national identity is interesting and suggests that policy-making to promote social cohesion and a sense of belonging should include community (not just national) elements. To me, this echoes the UK finding that new immigrants who completed the “Life in the UK” test in the context of an ESOL course (instead of just taking the test) had a better experience and felt like they were better integrated. 3) That black respondents were less likely to identify strongly with Canada and their province resonates with concern in the literature that discussions of social cohesion distract from real issues like employment difficulties and racism. 4) If respondents who identify as world citizens are more likely to identify positively with Canada, then current government moves to re-territorialize citizenship will likely be counterproductive.


Purpose: The research examines the intersections between precarious legal status and precarious employment. The authors offer an analytical framework for examining this intersection empirically. Rather than solely examining these two processes independently, they use a work-citizenship nexus (Munck 2008) to measure the cumulative non-linear path-dependent effect of intersecting forms of precarity in work and immigration. They cite existing literature that shows that unauthorized migration is linked to negative employment outcomes. However, by focusing on the long-term, cumulative, and intersecting relationship between work and citizenship, they challenge the notion that regularization of status necessarily translates into positive work outcomes. Rather, they show that entering Canada with any form of precarious migratory status – whether authorized (e.g. temporary foreign worker program) or unauthorized, has a long-term negative effect on conditions and terms of employment (327).

Methods: The authors measured work outcomes using an Index of Precarious Work (IPW), which is an 8-indicator index based on data from the 2005-2006 Immigrants and Precarious Employment Project, which included both qualitative and quantitative data (N=300) in the Greater Toronto Area (331). They compared outcomes of job precarity for three groups of participants: (1) those who entered with and retained secure migratory status; (2) those who entered and remained in a form of precarious status; and (3) those who shifted into secure status after entering with precarious status (326).

The authors are critical of empirical approaches that use dichotomous categories (e.g. legal vs unauthorized) to measure labour market outcomes. They also argue that newer studies using wider, non-dichotomous legal statuses are promising, but still fall short of capturing the dynamism of the work-citizenship nexus. Instead, they use analytical categories of precarious status and precarious work based on the IPW index and measured across temporal transitions, to offer a more dynamic analysis (334).

Findings: The authors found long-lasting effects of precarious legal status on employment conditions, even after regularization (or secure legal status) has been achieved (326). In other words, the only group that had low rates of precarity were those who arrived with secure status (e.g. permanent resident) and remained in secure status. Those who entered Canada as
authorized migrants but on a temporary basis (e.g. Live in Caregiver program) were likely to remain in precarious work even after acquiring permanent residence (336).

**Other significant findings:** In terms of individual and household factors: they found that gender was significant, with women more likely to work in jobs with high levels of precarity compared to men. However, age and region of origin were not significant (334).

Language finding was also interesting: attending language classes was not significant, however, English competence learned through life/work experience or prior to coming to Canada did protect respondents from highly precarious work (334).

Another significant finding was that level of education does not safeguard against precarious work – a finding that the authors suggest is “deeply troubling” given the points system in Canada.


**Purpose:** The editors and contributors to this edited volume seek “to understand the dynamics of illiberal practices in liberal states in Europe” (Guild et.al. p. 1). The volume focuses on the relationship between immigration, citizenship, and integration law and policy in the European and national arenas as the loci of these illiberal practices, in particular as they affect third country nationals (TCNs) and their access to EU rights. As such, it examines the dilemmas and contradictions that follow from the EU’s attempts to harmonize the rules on TCNs through the ‘EU Framework on Integration’ and Member States’ struggle to regain sovereignty under the banner of integration and the principle of subsidiarity (Guild et.al. p. 1). Among other things, the editors and contributors to the volume argue that the normativisation of mandatory civic integration at the hands of Member States in national arenas results in part from conflicts in the negotiations surrounding EU directives and their application in domestic legal systems. The book contains 19 chapters that are organized in two sections to examine the relationship between integration, citizenship, and immigration in Europe. These sections address Citizenship and Integration and Immigration and Integration in both European and national arenas. The first subsection focuses on European citizenship as a tool for integration, examining TCNs electoral rights and citizenship tests. The second subsection looks at the impact of EU enlargement on nation-building, taking into consideration issues such as citizenship laws, perspectives on dual citizenship, and policies of religious accommodation and their relation to integration in the national arena. The contributions to the third subsection aim to reconceptualise the notion of integration at the EU level, focusing in particular on how integration of TCNs might be related to the freedom of movement across European nations and national policies that govern social assistance benefits and protection from discrimination on the basis of residency. The last subsection also returns to the national arenas to examine questions of integration in light of TCNs’ mobility, the increasing onus put on immigrants to integrate as a their personal responsibility, and the contradictions that emerge between the different levels of immigrations and integration policies and the discretionary power of the state.

**Methods:** Qualitative. Socio-legal analysis of EU and national integration laws and policies.

**Findings:** “Integration functions as a tool for practising an immigration policy aimed at limiting the legal channels of international human mobility and the inclusion and security of TCNs inside
the EU” (p. 5). “Integration implies the continuance of the nation-state and its nationhood and identity, as well as its degree of discretion to determine and categorise people according to a subjective test of perfection in an increasingly supranational legal and policy-setting environment. The illiberalism emerges sharply beyond the limits of the exceptionalism granted to the nation-state by EU immigration law when applying integration as a mandatory condition derogating access to European rights and freedoms by TCNs. The limits of the exceptionalism characterising certain integration policies in contemporary Europe however reside in the rule of law, the respect of individual fundamental rights as well as the EU’s substantive (general principles of EC law) and institutional mechanisms (Community Courts). These mechanisms limit and review the discreitional powers and illiberal practices of liberal regimes in the EU legal landscape and aim at protecting the rights and liberties of every person (including of course also TCNs) in relation to unacceptable actions and restrictions by national and EU public authorities. This is in our view what is really at stake when assessing illiberal liberal regimes and the limits of the nexus between integration, immigration, and citizenship in the EU” (p. 17).

Significance: “The question as to what the limits are in the discreitional powers enjoyed by the nation-state around ‘the conditionality of integration’ for TCNs to have access to EU rights and common standards stipulated by EU immigration law provides us with a key testing ground for evaluating the illiberal or liberal nature of the exceptionalism inherent in the applicability of mandatory civic integration” (p. 2,3). The book points to the potentially illiberal turn of policies that aim to draw sharper boundaries between citizens and non-citizens in the European context, but it could arguably apply to other contexts of immigration.


Region: Canada

Purpose: To use the case of the Lost Canadians to show that Canadian national identity is ethnicized (white) and rooted in notions of kinship, and to use this case as a means of opening up a normative discussion about the appropriate basis of membership in liberal states. Ultimately, this is an indictment of the way in which liberalism obscures the basis of membership: “the language of commitment and consent [in which claims by Lost Canadians are framed and accepted] completely obscures the birthright and kinship assertions that undergird the ‘consent of the governed that is alleged to ground he liberal democratic state” (p. 211).

Methods: Qualitative discourse analysis of stories told by lost Canadians in the course of judicial rulings, House of Commons committee hearings and debates, and in news reports. The author focuses on three individuals who received the most attention in these venues.

Findings: The Lost Canadian considered in the article make claims to Canadian belonging in terms of shared ethnicity/kinship, and (family’s military) commitment to Canada.

Significance: Making citizenship about a shared sense of belonging (which is not neutral) can make citizenship acquisition alienating for individuals with a history that is not rooted in the same cultural assumptions as the receiving country. Also, the fact that legislation was put in place in 2008 to redress the problems created by the 1946 Act shows that Canadian citizenship is not a level (civic) playing field.

Region: Canada (The article contains great summaries of legislative shifts leading/responding to the Lost Canadian and Lebanon evacuees).

Purpose: To consider what citizenship claims by two distinct groups (evacuees from Lebanon and Lost Canadians) reveal about the quality of Canadian identity contained in citizenship provisions.

Methods: Qualitative discourse analysis of media sources, parliamentary debates and committee hearings and reports, and the narrative used in them to describe the evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon and the Lost Canadians.

Findings: 1) “…we argue that the differing responses towards the Canadians evacuated from Lebanon and the Lost Canadians represent an expression of a racialized and ethnicized hierarchy of Canadian citizenship onto which notions of ‘home’ and ‘away’, ‘family’ and ‘foreigner’ are mapped, and expectations of entitlement and obligation are elaborated” (p. 294). 2) “Kinship provides the means through which a legal claim to national attachment is forged, but whether or not formal citizenship also provides and ‘authentic’ claim to belonging is bound to racialized conceptions of place” (p. 294).

Significance: Canadian citizenship policy does not lay out a neutral framework for membership: determining who has a claim to belonging “is marked by selective readings of the history of settlement and, indeed, an obscuring of the relations of power that have enabled settlement to proceed over time” (p. 312). All in all, this is a much clearer, more systematic effort to make some of the points made in Harder (2010).


Purpose: Methodological paper, which examines the validity, strengths, and weaknesses of various policy indexes being developed by scholars of citizenship and integration.

Methods: The author examines three major types of validity: content validity, which looks at the variety of aspects covered by each index and how these are defined in relation across indices; convergent validity, considers how indices that highly correlate are constructed in comparison; and finally, construct validity, which looks at the explanatory models over time and cases (558).

Findings: In terms of content validity, the author finds that there is no agreed-upon authoritative source of policy data on citizenship and integration (558). There is also considerable variation in the definition of key aspects of indices and their operationalization (558).

In terms of content validity, the author argues that it is important to differentiate between the policy outputs and policy outcomes, since outputs don’t necessarily lead to intended outcomes (559). For example, both Howard (2009) and Koopmans et al (2005) “use naturalization rates as part of their policy output indices – the author argues these should be excluded. It is also important to distinguish between immigration, integration, and citizenship policies as three separate gates of entrance (560).
The author also raises questions about whether or not naturalization rates actually measure effects of citizenship policies (561). Another alternative might be to look at rejection rates – however, this still does not include those candidates who interrupt their applications or decide not to apply in restrictive policy settings.

Finally, the author finds high correlations between different indices, and so asks if it would not be better to “stick to indices that require relatively few resources to be built” rather than creating new indices (570).


Purpose: The purpose of Howard’s (2009) book is to engage in an empirical and historical study of citizenship policies across old and new EU countries to understand continuity and change in their development since the 1980s. Howard creates a Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) using the 1980s as a baseline for his cross-national comparison. He then engages in a more in-depth analysis of each country. For purposes of this comparison, Howard uses the CPI index to categorize countries as “restrictive,” “medium,” or “liberal” to then investigate under what conditions was there a change in the direction of a country’s policies from one category to another in 2008. Howard’s analysis of the countries in each category takes into consideration two sets of factors: historical variation and what he calls “the politics of citizenship.” For example, to examine historical variation, Howard analyzes how colonial histories and timing in the adoption of democratic norms influenced the creation of more liberal citizenship laws. As part of the politics of citizenship, Howard considers factors explaining relative continuity and change of citizenship policies, which involve international and domestic pressures to liberalize approaches to citizenship and immigration and the ability of far right parties to mobilize public opinion on these subjects to counter these approaches, especially in the absence of public discussion and popular involvement. Ultimately, his aim is to raise questions concerning “the historical and contemporary trajectories of immigrant integration” (p. 13).

Methods: Howard engages in a historical and comparative quantitative analysis of citizenship policies across old and new countries (n = 27) that constituted the EU at the time. In addition to the cross-national study, Howard carries out a more in-depth analysis of the 15 old EU countries and the 12 ‘Accession countries.’ Howard’s Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) includes three components: citizenship based on *jus soli*, naturalization requirements (length of residency), and the tolerance of dual citizenship (p. 9). Each component is measured on a scale of zero to two, with a total possible CPI of six for the most inclusive country. On this basis, Howard creates his typology of restrictive, medium, and liberal citizenship policy countries.

Findings: In the 1980s, the restrictive category countries were Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, Italy, Greece, Spain, and Denmark. Finland, Sweden, Portugal, and the Netherlands were categorized as medium. In the liberal category were France, Ireland, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. The comparison of the early CPI scores with those of 2008 for these countries reveal the following changes: Germany and Luxembourg go from being restrictive to the medium category. At the same time, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden become liberal. Howard finds that citizenship policies did not become more restrictive in any of these countries. Howard finds that factors associated with historical variation as well as the politics of citizenship account for these changes. Other important findings: Howard finds that “non-democratic elite driven process may lead to more inclusive outcomes, whereas genuine popular involvement can
result in more restrictive laws and institutions” (p. 200). As such, Howard claims: “while citizenship liberalization is more likely to occur when the left is in power, the most important factor is the relative strength of far right parties, which can serve to mobilize latent anti-immigrant public opinion” (p. 53).

**Significance:** Howard argues that his most important contribution is that his study provides “a direct comparison of citizenship policies across EU member stats and their levels of restrictiveness” (p 18). In so doing, his book goes beyond the larger project on citizenship policy, the Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member States: Rules, Practices and Quantitative Developments,” (NATAC) directed by Rainer Bauböck and funded by the European Commission, that constitutes this book’s context. A significant finding in Howard’s study is his ability to show using empirical data how the far right has been able to systematically mobilize public opinion to counter attempts to liberalize citizenship and immigration policies. This is important, according to Howard, since “citizenship acquisition can serve as a rough measure of integration” (p. 8). In so doing, Howard urges policy makers and analysts to take into consideration how nationalism can be mobilized to exclude immigrants from citizenship, particularly ethnic minorities, by preventing their integration.


**Region:** Europe (35 countries)

**Purpose:** To move from qualitative to quantitative (and comparative) assessment of the administrative obstacles and opportunities for naturalization, by developing an index for measuring the bureaucratic aspect of naturalization procedures and applying it to 35 European countries. The paper describes one part of a project on “Access to Citizenship and Immigrant Integration” (ACIT), namely the development of “Citizenship Implementation indicators” (CITIMP) to measure formal administrative aspects of naturalization procedures. Another part of the project – citizenship law indicators (CITLAW) that describe legal requirements for naturalization – is used to discuss the relationship between legal and administrative aspects of naturalization in the countries under investigation.

**Methods:** This paper describes the creation of the CITIMP index, which takes into account five dimensions of implementation: Promotion (how authorities help applicants meet legal requirements); documentation (how applicants prove they meet legal requirements); discretion (how much room authorities have to interpret legal requirements); bureaucracy (how authorities come to a decision); and review (how strong judicial oversight of the naturalization procedure is). Along these dimensions, 38 CITIMP indicators were created for 35 European states, based on a questionnaire (in the Annex) that was answered by independent experts in each country, based on an analysis of naturalization procedures in effect as of 31 December 2011. Scores were then calculated for each indicator, from 0.0 for “critically unfavourable” to 1.0 for “fully favourable” (see p. 7). In addition to describing the results by dimension, the paper also presents bivariate correlation analyses of the CITLAW and CITIMP indexes (Figure p. 38), as well as bivariate correlation analyses of the indicators in CITIMP (Table p. 40).
Findings: 1) CITIMP overall averages: overall scores were relatively low (0.42 out of 1.0), and only 13 European countries received a score of 0.5 or higher. The highest-scoring country was Sweden (0.68), and Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Germany, and France received scores over 0.6. 2) The bivariate correlation analysis of the CITLW and CITIMP indices show no positive correlation between the two. Countries with more inclusive laws have fewer procedural obstacles. 3) Patterns: “Promotional measures are often missing or poor quality. Legal exemptions for documentation rarely exist on humanitarian or vulnerability grounds. Documentation from countries of origin is especially complicated for applicants. Not only are most ordinary naturalization procedures discretionary, but so are many language, integration, and economic resource requirements. Most procedures involve potentially long processing times and some level of bureaucracy, especially when the deciding authority is the executive or legislature. Judicial review is often not guaranteed for language or integration requirements or on specific issues such as discrimination within the procedure” (p. 45) 3) The bivariate correlation analysis of links between CITLAW and CITIMP and among the CITIMP indicators revealed a moderately strong relationship between promotion measures and the level of discretion: “the more clearly that the law defines who can become a citizen, the more active is the state in informing and assisting potential citizens” (p. 40). There is also a link between levels of bureaucracy, documentation, and discretion (nice description on p. 45).  

Significance: 1) Citizenship uptake is not just determined by immigrant characteristics, but by legal frameworks established by the state. 2) When it comes to evaluating those legal frameworks, it is not enough to consider the letter of the law: one must also take into account the administrative practices through which the law is implemented.


Region: United States (receiving country)

Purpose: To add to a literature that focuses on the impact of “demographic” factors (age, income, geographic proximity of native country) on naturalization by highlighting the “ideal, emotional or psychological factors” that play a role (e.g. “identifying as American” or believing that naturalization is a betrayal of the native country) (p. 314).

Methods: This is a small-N qualitative study based on 34 “relatively unstructured” interviews with adult Dominicans living in New York and New Jersey in 2009. Of the 34, four had naturalized and 30 had not. The sample was not randomly selected. Subject were asked whether or not they had naturalized or planned to do so, and why. Also, demographic information on the participants was collected (city of origin in the Dominican Republic, years in the United States, age, gender, work, and family).

Findings: “…there are many different reasons why Dominicans do not naturalize. Each of the recognized theories receives support in our interviews.” (p. 333). The value-added of this article is that it highlights the “political administrative” hurdles to naturalization, such as monetary costs, intrusive interviews, and the need to understand and navigate complex institutional processes (p. 333). It also emphasizes the emotional component of the decision, like the sense that one would be renouncing the country of origin.
**Significance:** Joins other calls for immigration policies to take account of the transnational component of citizenship: “US immigration law retains a naïve view of citizenship, embedded in the sociological concepts of an earlier era, in which immigrants quickly assimilated, ergo naturalized [...] We may have studied an early emergence of an increasing problem, the redefinition of citizenship to meet the needs of people who are genuinely part of more than one country” (p. 334-335).


**Purpose:** This paper examines the measurements and methods of naturalization used in the literature on pathways to citizenship and naturalization in industrialized countries. Its focus is on how to develop measures of naturalization that can be used in statistical research to explain cross-national differences in naturalization rates. Janoski argues “one must fully understand and trust the construction of naturalization data and estimates of the *jus soli* process. So that researchers can be clear in their calculations of naturalization, the intent of this article is to clarify the advantages and disadvantages of the different ways that naturalization rates are conceptualized, measured and standardized” (p. 650).

**Methods:** The paper reviews the ways in which researchers have conceptualized, measured and estimated naturalization as a pathway to citizenship. It examines five issues related to naturalization data in the 18 advanced industrialized countries that are reviewed over three or more decades concerning how researchers: “(i) measure the number of people who naturalize and become citizens; (ii) assess the number of people who are born of foreign parents and gain nationality through *jus soli* rules; (iii) categorize the foreigners who have special integration privileges; (iv) determine the base upon which naturalization should be standardized; and (v) consider rates other than the total naturalization rates, such as rejection rates, cohort rates and country-specific naturalization rates” (p. 650).

**Findings:** The paper identifies a narrow and a wide approach to measuring naturalization. Each approach may have implications for the kind of research that can be conducted. A narrow approach to naturalization focuses exclusively on the naturalization process, that is, the pathways through which foreign nationals acquire citizenship in their host country which excludes *jus soli* citizenship: “However, when countries have different citizenship rules, a broad outlook toward how people become citizens should be taken, especially if these measures are indicators of how much a particular country integrates foreigners. When the results of *jus soli* rules are not taken into account, naturalization rates clearly understate the number of people who obtain citizenship” (p. 651). Thus, “while the narrow definition remains based on incoming foreigners, corrections need to be made to implement the broad definition to make naturalization comparable between *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* countries. This is why measures of *jus soli* citizenship may be included in the naturalization rate” (p. 651). As such, a wide definition of naturalization is “the acquisition of citizenship (i) by foreigners – not returning nationals; (ii) by decree – going through varied naturalization processes; (iii) by declaration – declaring oneself a citizen on the basis of marriage to or adoption by a citizen; or (iv) by being born to foreign parents on national soil.” (p. 651). Ultimately, Janoski finds that narrow measures of naturalization are useful at “the macro-level” when the focus of research is on the process of naturalization through which immigrants obtain citizenship. At the “micro-level” it is useful to analyze the naturalization process “as it occurs through government citizenship bureaucracies.
as a special treatment effect with socialization tests and ceremonies” (p. 667). In contrast, a wide approach is important to estimate the number of *jus soli* births in a country and, as such, to estimate “the overall impact of strangers gaining integration into a new country through citizenship, and it also provides a strong measure of the impact of how country or regime policies differ” (p. 667). Other ways of measuring naturalization rates or the base upon which naturalization should be standardized were examined, including “stocks of foreign population, stocks of foreign-born population or the population as a whole” in addition to “rejection and group-specific rates” (p. 667). For Janoski, “rejection rates in themselves become a scalpel that shows specifically how the state and its officials may create or re-enforce barriers to citizenship. If researchers want a concept that targets the impact of immigrants gaining citizenship on the receiving society, the wider concept of naturalization rates that includes *jus soli* is the better measure” (p. 667).

**Significance:** Janoski recognizes that citizenship is a tool through which states stratify their populations with important implications for the ways in which immigrants can acquire and protect their rights. Cross-national explanation of naturalization rates are not common in the literature, but it is important to engage in these analyses.


**Purpose:** The 400-page report of which the Liebig and von Haaren chapter is a part is an outcome of a joint seminar on naturalization and socio-economic integration among EU and OECD countries in 2010. The overall report found that “While naturalisation can be a useful integration tool in some contexts, it is clearly one that has to be used with caution, not least because host-country citizens may disapprove of what they perceive as a “devaluation” of citizenship” (4).

In the chapter by the authors, they provide an overview of naturalization and employment across OECD and EU countries. The purpose of the chapter was to examine empirical data centred around three main questions: (1) How do naturalized immigrants and naturalized children of immigrants fare in the labour market compared to counterparts who have not taken up nationality of the host country; (2) Are there improvements in outcomes after naturalization (i.e. longitudinal)? And (3) Why do outcomes of some immigrants improve after naturalization?

**Methods:** Statistical data on OECD and EU countries as well as a review of existing empirical studies.

**Findings:** Overall, they found a positive relationship between naturalization and labour market outcomes across a range of factors such as higher employment probability, higher wages, and better occupational status (48). This is driven in part by positive selection of migrants into citizenship, which is also in turn partly due to self-selection of ‘successful’ migrants by host countries (48). However, although there is limited longitudinal data that suggests that beyond positive selection, there are benefits on likelihood to find employment, quality of employment and wages (49).

Canada has the second highest number of naturalizations among OECD countries in 2008 (at 176 000), after the US (nearly double at 1.05M) (p.26). Among OECD countries, Canada also
has the largest share of naturalized immigrants, where almost 90% of immigrants of both genders have naturalized (p.26).

Dual citizenships: to the degree that it enhances the propensity to naturalise which in turn is associated with better outcomes, the overall impact of dual citizenship appears to be positive, at least in economic terms” (30).

Employment rates tend to be higher for naturalized immigrants, although only by a small margin (average of 2%). The authors argue that this finding is surprising given the large differences in educational attainments. (32).

In countries with jus soli (e.g. Canada), virtually all native-born children of immigrants have the host country nationality (43) “With respect to employment, overall there does not seem to be a strong association between having the host-country nationality and the probability to be employed for the children of immigrants. By contrast, there seems to be a link between naturalisation and the chances of having a high-skilled job” (44).


Region: United Kingdom

Purpose: To provide a “sustained engagement” with the experience or interpretation of anti-terrorism policies as they impact a sense of citizenship/national belonging among “ordinary” citizens (p. 758).

Method: Qualitative: 14 focus groups conducted in 2010. The groups were organized around geographical variables (metropolitan/non-metropolitan) and ethnicity (black/white/Asian). The research was designed to enable a comparison of perceptions and experiences among different parts of the UK population.

Findings: “…citizens of various ethnic and geographical demographics perceive a diminishment of citizenship that stems from anti-terrorism measures. Amongst many of our black and Asian participants, there was a belief that their rights and participations, as well as their sense of national identity, had been eroded by anti-terrorism policies, a sense that they are becoming, as one individual argued, ‘second class citizens’ (Birmingham, Asian, female). [Participants] highlighted a condition of ‘disconnected citizenship’ (Jarvis and Lister 2013) characterized by contrasting experiences of citizenship amongst white individuals and those of other ethnic groups. Anti-terrorism powers, in this sense at least, may therefore be creating – or contributing to – a differential experience of citizenship, with varying perceptions of, and attachments to, this category’s core dimensions” (p. 760).

Significance: This article suggests that concerns about the relationship between citizenship and attachment to a country have to take into account the broader institutional context, particularly other policies that address people who have naturalized or who are on the path to naturalization.

Region: United States

Purpose: To go beyond the focus in the literature on naturalization on individual-level factors, by taking into account the social and political context in which naturalization decisions are made. Specific contexts of interest are belonging to an ethnic/racial group, community dynamics (ethnic/immigrant composition of communities), material and symbolic support for immigrants in the receiving country’s institutional context (e.g. restrictive policies toward non-citizens), and the institutional context of the country of origin (whether dual citizenship is allowed, level of political stability).

Methods: Multivariate analysis of the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 US census. The dependent variable was citizenship status, and the analysis was conducted for five ethnic/racial groups: non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, Asian, and Other. Individual-level predictors included: length of residence, English ability, marital status, number of children, gender, household income, education, home ownership. Community contexts was captured through the following variables (based on “PUMA of residence” – one PUMA averages about 100,000 residents): percentage of adult naturalized citizens, isolation index, household income ratio. Country of origin factors included: Freedom House’s 3-point ranking of countries in terms of civil liberty and political freedom (free, partly free, not free) and access to dual citizenship. Measures of the receiving state’s policy environment were: an index of safety-net welfare services to non-citizens, and an indicator of “immigrant receptivity” based on data from the General Social Survey in the years 1995 to 1997), minority co-ethnic political empowerment (Black, Latino and Asian co-ethnic office-holding and naturalization), and state-level voting requirements (whether or not the state required voters to show personal identification before casting a ballot). With respect to the latter, the authors note: “We do not know enough about electoral procedures to be sure how to interpret the effect. Possibly voter identification rules are a proxy for rates of voter registration or voting, or for the strength of immigrant organizations in state politics, or for another similar phenomenon that could be salient in immigrants’ lives” (p. 551).

Findings: 1) Individual-level predictors (age, years in US, English ability, and education) affect the propensity to naturalize. However, this propensity varies by racial/ethnic group. “After controlling for individual background characteristics, Asian and Black immigrants have much higher odds of naturalization than do whites, and the addition of further controls (especially the naturalization rates of other co-ethnics in the same urban area) leaves whites as the least likely to naturalize” p. 550). 2) There was a strong place effect: “where a higher share of group members in the local area has naturalized, persons in our sample are also more likely to have become citizens” (p. 550). 3) Immigrants from politically repressive countries are more likely to naturalize. 4) Voter identification requirements have a significant, depressant impact on naturalization tendencies for all immigrant groups. 5) Hispanic, black and Asian immigrants are less likely to naturalize in areas where there are fewer state-wide restrictions on public services to immigrants.

Significance: 1) The different outcomes by racial/ethnic group, with whites being least likely to naturalize, “offers support for the theory that seeking citizenship not only reflects people’s incorporation into American society as individuals, a process of assimilation, but also is a
collective behavior associated with minority status” (p. 550). 2) Naturalization may be a group-influence response to a hostile environment (see finding #5). 3) Naturalization is not about individual assimilation; instead it has a collective character, affected by belong to ethnic/racial groups and particular political and community contexts.


Region: United Kingdom

Purpose: To investigate the effects of the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act (which introduced a citizenship ceremony, a citizenship test, tighter English language requirements, and the concept of earned citizenship) on people targeted by that policy. The authors call this policy the “coheshion-through-citizenship project of the New Labour government” (p. 380). The article seeks answers to the following questions about “the most radical changes to the system in 30 years”: “Has it achieved what it set out to achieve? What impact has it had on newcomers’ understanding of what it means to be a British citizen? Do they feel and act more British? Has community cohesion been increased? (p. 366).

Methods: Qualitative interviews with 14 key informants (city councilors, registrars, ESOL teachers, and support workers for new immigrants), participant observation of two citizenship ceremonies at Stoke-On-Trent Town Hall (including casual discussions with new citizens and their guests), and interviews and focus groups with 20 non-EU immigrants to the UK who were in different stages of acquiring citizenship. Two focus groups involved ESOL learners from non-EU countries, and one involved English-speaking university staff and students from the US, Canada, and New Zealand.

Findings: 1) No participants said that the citizenship ceremony made them feel “British” or welcome in the local community. 2) Those who fulfilled the test requirements in the context of an ESOL course felt more welcomed (contact to other immigrants, introduction to culture) than those who simply took the Life in the UK test (also, no one said they learned/remembered anything from the test). 3) Some participants were offended by the low level of knowledge presumed by the study guide and the perceived condescension in its tone. 4) Participants felt they were being held to a higher standard of “Britishness” than the general public (e.g. through demonstrating knowledge of the political system); “one suggested facetiously, it would be better to test them on their knowledge of football, celebrities and soaps” (p. 377). In other words, participants saw the test as a symbolic way for the British government to maintain “the ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction” (p. 377). 5) There is a fundamental disconnect between what the UK government thinks citizenship should mean (citizenship as proof of acceptance of “British values”, political participation, a shared sense of belonging) and what participants think it means (a passport). “Most immigrants we asked could not answer the question of what are ‘British values’ and seemed confused by it” p. 379). 6) Some aspects of the process (confusing bureaucracy and forms, poor treatment by civil servants) made participants feel alien and unwelcome and “thereby may unintentionally undermine the Government’s goal of fostering community cohesion-through-citizenship” (p. 381). 7) Participant experiences differed based on their race, class, educational backgrounds and countries of origin.

Significance: It takes more than numbers to understand the effects of citizenship policies and their attendant components (e.g. tests), and this is one of few studies that seeks answers
among people affected by these policies. The article echoes findings for Canada (e.g. Reitz 2012) that a “key ingredient” of the citizenship process (missing thin the UK, according to the authors) is “genuine public support of immigration and multiculturalism and outward signs of respect for newcomers” (p. 384). Condescending, punitive, suspicion-raising undertones of instruments such as citizenship tests could thus undermine the most important factor leading to a sense of belonging and social cohesion.


Region: Canada

Purpose: “We survey the sources of popular anxiety around multiple citizenship and focus on two recurrent objections regarding claims by dual citizens outside Canada to legal rights associated with citizenship. The first objection is that because nonresident citizens do not live in Canada, they do not demonstrate the appropriate degree of commitment to Canada. The second is that since nonresident citizens do not pay taxes, they are not entitled to claim the rights of citizenship” (p. 1).

Methods: Literature review/secondary sources.

Findings: We respond to these claims as follows: First, very few legal rights attach to citizenship. Access to public health care, most social benefits and education all depend on provincial residence, not citizenship. Second, Canada already restricts the exercise of the franchise by Canadians abroad more than many other states. Third, consular assistance is, by definition, only sought by citizens abroad. For reasons of principle and practicality, we counsel against discriminating between mono- and dual or multiple citizens for purposes of extending consular assistance in what are often emergency situations. Finally, proposals to require nonresident citizens to pay tax as a precondition to maintaining the rights of citizenship are ill-conceived. The United States is the only country that requires nonresident citizens to pay tax on worldwide income, but in practice the law creates several exceptions to the requirement to pay and is both complicated and expensive to administer. It is not a model to emulate” (p. 1).

Significance: 1) Good discussion of how public perceptions of “underserving” citizens (e.g. that they don’t contribute because they don’t pay taxes and freeload on services like health care) are disconnected from legal reality (i.e. that health case is tied to provincial residence requirements, not citizenship, and that Canada already curtails voting rights for citizens abroad for more than five years). 2) Ties in nicely with the more discourse-oriented articles in this section on the good/bad citizen dichotomy, particular around Lost Canadians (mentioned here briefly) and the evacuees from Lebanon (also discussed here).

**Region:** Canada

**Purpose:** To consider the question of whether Canadian citizenship policy in 2009 was contributing to a breakdown of social cohesion, and whether following European trends in citizenship policy (mandatory integration courses, limited access to dual citizenship, and tougher naturalization tests) could help rectify any perceived or real decline in social cohesion.

**Method:** Review of secondary sources.

**Findings:** 1) Because of the relatively high overlap between the values of immigrants and the native-born population, more European-style measures are probably a) unnecessary, and b) would create a double-standard of “Canadianness” by demanding that immigrants have a command of knowledge that native-born Canadians generally do not. 2) The discussions focus on values takes attention away from real issues that threaten social cohesion: impediments to economic integration (e.g. skill underutilization) and racial/ethnic discrimination.

**Significance:** 1) The points raised here echo concerns raised by research participants in the UK (article on citizenship tests and how participants perceive them). 2) The point about employment – not shared values – being key for social cohesion echoes one of the results of the Environics survey that one of the best ways to help new immigrants feel like good citizens is to help find them jobs (17% of all respondents said so; interestingly, immigrants were more likely to say jobs, and native-born respondents were more likely to say “teach them about Canadian culture” – see p. 3).


**Region:** United States (receiving country); Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Brazil (sending countries).

**Purpose:** To determine whether dual-citizenship policies in sending countries lead to higher naturalization rates in the receiving country.

**Methods:** The author uses a difference-in-difference analysis to compare the change over time in outcomes of immigrants coming from Latin American countries that legalized dual citizenship in the 1990s (‘treatment’ group) with the change over time in outcomes of immigrants from Latin American countries that did not change the law (‘control’ group) (p.173-174). The treatment group consists of Costa Ricans, Dominican Republicans, Brazilians, Colombians, and Ecuadorians. The control group consists of Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Other Latin American, also the author sometime runs the models excluding Mexico as one way of controlling for biases deriving from the presence of large numbers of people with illegal status. This is done using microdata from the 1990 and 2000 US censuses – the 5% and 1% Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) files (p. 175). The author also takes into account economic outcomes (employment, welfare use, income) and controls for numerous things like illegal status, state of residence, education, age, gender, year of arrival.

**Findings:** 1) “…newly granted dual citizenship rights by five important Latin American sending countries in the 1990s positively affected the US naturalization rate among immigrants from those countries […there was an…] increase of 10 percentage points in the probability of
naturalizations over the 1990s among immigrants coming from Colombia, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Brazil” (p. 186-187). 2) Immigrants from countries that
changed their policies to allow dual citizenship also experience employment and earnings gains,
as well as a lower reliance on welfare.

Significance: 1) The article supports the notion that the ability to maintain citizenship in the
country of origin promotes naturalization in a receiving country (previous literature inconclusive).
This suggests that research on naturalization should take into account how policies in sending
countries could influence decision-making around naturalization in the receiving country. 2)
Improved employment outcomes and reduction in welfare reliance among naturalized
immigrants contradicts earlier studies that maintain that access to welfare is a main impetus for
naturalization. 3) Receiving states should encourage sending states to allow dual nationality,
due to the higher propensity of immigrants from such countries to naturalize and the economic
benefits associated with that naturalization (which translates into improved economic
integration).

Michalowski, I. 2011. “Required to Assimilate? The Content of Citizenship Tests in Five
Countries.” Citizenship Studies 15 (6-7): 749-68.

Region: Europe (Austria, UK, Germany, Netherlands) and North America (USA)

Purpose: “[T]he objective of the present study is twofold. On the empirical level, it aims to
provide a systematic comparative content analysis of citizenship tests in five countries, and to
thereby do away with anecdotal evidence–analyses (which so often yield biased impressions of
citizenship tests, by focusing on particularly odd and non-representative or even on non-existing
test questions). On the theoretical level, it aims to contribute to the debate over how to interpret
these tests – investigating whether they are an attempt at cultural assimilation, or if their content
respects the pluralist limits of liberal democracies” (p. 751).

Methods: Countries were chosen to represent varied citizenship regimes: one with an open
regime (UK with an MIPEX score of 62), one with a restrictive regime (Austria with an MIPEX
score of 22), one with a rather open regime (Netherlands MIPEX score of 51), and one with a
rather closed regive (Germany, MIPEX score of 38). The US was added because it represents
political liberalism and an open citizenship regime. “To analyse the five citizenship tests, I
performed a content analysis: operating first with 14 thematic sub-categories that can be
regrouped into three overall thematic categories. The purpose of the overall thematic categories
is to raise the level of abstraction, while the thematic sub-categories have been added to allow
for a more detailed analysis of specific issues involved in the citizenship tests. [...]The overall
thematic categories and thematic sub-categories were both compiled inductively. [...]In addition,
every item has been classified – according to its orientation – towards (1) factual knowledge
and/or knowledge of ‘what is right’, or towards (2) opinions and the knowledge of ‘what is good’
in the sense of social norms and moral (see Table 5) [NOTE: The author is drawing here on
Joppke, who draws on Rawls to operationalize the difference between pluralist and
assimilationist policies]. Hence, the second category not only comprises questions that
‘scrutinize the candidate’s inner disposition’ (Joppke 2010a, p. 140), but also ones that require
knowledge about a social norm believed to be generally accepted in the host society, even
though they are not laid down in law. For the reasons mentioned above, these questions have
been classified as concerning ‘what is good’ as well” (p. 753).
Findings: 1) Liberal outcomes for Germany and Austria ("thinner and more procedural" (p. 764). 2) "Comparatively strong emphasis in the UK and the Netherlands [...] on the welfare state and the provision of public goods and services" (p. 763). "...43% of the British questions and 46% of the Dutch questions (but only 8% of the US, Austrian or German test questions) address rather practical issues in the field of education, economic order and finances, work and self-employment, the public service and its financing, and the health system" (p. 763). 3) "Dutch test guidelines refer to a set of constitutional rights and freedoms yet also ask questions on ‘what is good’ – questions that do not satisfy the criteria of political liberalism applied here" (p. 763).

Significance: 1) "...neither the surrounding citizenship regime nor the procedural details of the testing procedure [...] help predict the content of citizenship tests" (p. 764); "...the content of citizenship tests in restrictive citizenship policy regimes can be as liberal (in the Rawlsian sense of this term) as the content of citizenship tests in open citizenship policy regimes" (p. 765). 2) This might work the other way around, too: the content of citizenship tests in open policy regimes can be illiberal (perhaps, too, in the case of Canada?). This article might link up nicely with discussions of belonging and citizenship tests in Canada, and to discussions (in the UK) about how ordinary people experience the tests: just because a country is considered open does not mean it can be taken for granted that its notions of belonging (as reflected in citizenship tests) are liberal (read: culturally neutral), and the content matters for immigrants’ ability to feel a sense of belonging in the country of reception.


Region: United States

Purpose: To test the instrumental-legalistic theoretical perspective (IL) on naturalization, which, in line with rational choice models, stats that an immigrant’s decision to naturalize is rooted in cost and benefit calculations: if the benefits outweigh the costs, immigrants naturalize (p. 658). The authors test this by studying the impact of welfare reform on immigrant naturalization rates, specifically the tendency of elderly immigrants to naturalize before and after the introduction of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA).

Method: Probit regression analysis of individual-level data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the US Department of Labor's Current Population Survey (CPS), from pre-PRWORA (1994-1996) and post-PRWORA (2003-2008) timeframes. Added to this are state-level data on Medicaid eligibility ("state generosity", p. 663), state unemployment, and the proportion of immigrants in the state population. The dependent variable was a dummy indicator of being a naturalized citizen. The study also uses individual-level demographic and socioeconomic variables: race/ethnic origin, age, gender, education, marital status, disability status, household size, income-to-needs ratio, home ownership, asset income, numbers of years in the US, and a proxy for “refugee” status (based on country of origin). The analysis employed a “differences-in-differences” approach which “estimates the impact of a policy by comparing changes in outcomes (e.g. naturalization) between states with different policies (e.g. generous versus non-generous states) and between a target group (e.g. immigrant at a high risk of participating in a public assistance program) and a non-target group” (p. 667).

Findings: 1) “Elderly immigrants’ naturalization increased at a significantly higher rate among
those with a high probability of Medicaid participation than among those with a low probability” (p.676). 2) “The rate of increase in naturalization was higher in generous states among elderly immigrants unlikely to participate in public assistance programs” (p. 676), not higher in non-generous states than in generous states.

**Significance:** Limited support for the IL perspective: Finding #2 suggests that “elderly immigrants’ naturalization may have been influenced by factors not related to access to public benefits” (p. 66-76). State generosity in general might have an effect here: generosity of Medicaid access for non-citizens might be part of a broadly favourable and supportive climate toward immigrants (in line with the generosity of Medicaid access); generous states may also provide more support services for naturalization.


**Region:** Canada and USA (receiving countries)

**Purpose:** To assess whether there is a labour market benefit associated with naturalizations, and to explain the gap in naturalization rates that has opened up between the USA and Canada since the 1970s.

**Methods:** 1) Review of secondary literature pertaining to determinants of citizenship uptake and economic benefits of citizenship in Canada and the USA. 2) OLS regressions using Canadian and American census data and American survey data

**Findings:**

Determinants of citizenship uptake: 1) immigrant traits (education/income, time since arrival, etc.); 2) source country characteristics (GDP relative to receiving country, human rights record – explains why refugees have had the highest citizenship-uptake rates of all entry classes in Canada); 3) official language proficiency helps; 4) Problem with all of this is that it is hard to say whether these variables effect citizenship uptake or whether it is more a mater of unobserved and self-selection effects.

Have determinants changed? No, but the characteristics of immigrants have, hence uptake rates have: “…over the period from 1970/71 to 2006, changing immigrant characteristics accounted for between 48% and 62% of the increase in the citizenship rate gap between Canada and the United States” (p. 33).

**Significance:** Lends empirical support for Bauboeck’s (2010) call to conceptualize citizenship as “citizenship constellations”, which include status in sending countries, rather than only as a status that is awarded and affects the receiving country. Case in point: Picot and Hou show that citizenship uptake is higher for immigrants from developing countries and countries with uncertain legal conditions, and that it is lower for immigrants from countries in close geographical proximity (e.g. Mexicans in the United States).

**Region:** United States

**Purpose:** Schneider's (2011) book aims “to explain how our understanding of immigration and citizenship [in the United States] has changed over the past hundred years in ways that have deeply influenced immigration and naturalization policy” (p. 2). In particular, the book focuses on immigrants’ relationship with the state, both in their home country and in the United States, as they engage in the multiple border crossings that structure their journey. These borders are physical, legal, and cultural, but also psychological, and they structure immigrants’ experiences of departure, arrival, deportation, assimilation (Americanization), and naturalization. The book’s chapters explore these border crossings by looking at context of exit in different immigrant-sending countries; the continuously changing context of reception that immigrants faced as they arrived in the United States; the ways in which both local and federal authorities used deportation and naturalization as a means of social control; “Americanization” as both a potentially coercive policy and a result of immigrants’ exercise of agency in how they wanted to live in the United States; and the changing politics of citizenship and naturalization. Schneider ultimately analyzes how government policy and administration and immigrants’ individual and collective experiences interact to show that immigration is an “open-ended process” (p. 9). It is through this interplay that national borders and notions of belonging are defined and recast.

**Methods:** Schneider’s work is historical and qualitative. She draws on archival data, secondary sources, and oral history to analyze both government immigrant policies and immigrants’ individual and collective experiences. Her book emphasizes first decades of the 20th century “because that is when contemporary borders and border crossings were organized in ways that have endured to this day” (p. 5). However, she incorporates an analysis of late 19th century and mid-to late 20th century changes in immigration policy and its effects on immigrants’ experiences.

**Findings:** Schneider’s book points out that “Americanization” and citizenship/naturalization have never had the same meaning and have never been experienced in the same way over the last century. The politics and meaning of citizenship and belonging have been always tied to political interests and state power. However, political interests and state power alone are not the only determinants – the policies that govern immigrants’ experiences and understandings of “Americanization” and naturalization also opened up spaces of negotiation that immigrants could actively utilize, although factors like gender and race restricted or amplified this space.

**Significance:** Schneider emphasizes that “law would always try to make naturalization a uniform procedure and an act of fundamental allegiance, but immigrants [make] it a meaningful border crossing in simple or complex ways that no government [can] anticipate or prescribe” (p. 241).


**Purpose:** In this article, Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos examine the degree to which Germany’s 1999 citizenship reform satisfies two longstanding objectives regarding the incorporation of immigrants: granting the children of immigrants born in Germany citizenship at
birth and liberalizing naturalization requirements (p. 53). Thus, the article examines whether the reform was able to act “as a bridge” facilitating not only the incorporation of migrants into German society, but also closing social gaps between Germans and migrants. Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos examine the so-called Optionsmodell, which requires children of immigrant parents born in Germany to choose between their parents’ citizenship and German citizenship by the age of 23 as one of the main limitations to the reform. In addition, they focus on the material and symbolic barriers to naturalization that structure the context of the reform and the incentives that migrants have to naturalize. Ultimately, Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos argue that the reform has failed to attain its objectives to improve the status of children born in German of immigrant parents and to facilitate the naturalization of settled immigrants (p. 54). According to the authors: “These shortcomings in the law’s results reflect the inadequacy of its content: politically driven compromises that were necessary to pass the law have proven costly in terms of its performance” (p. 54).

Method: This article engages in a historical analysis of German citizenship laws to contextualize the 1999 reform, as well as its shortcomings, evident in the declining naturalization rates that have been prevalent in Germany since the early 2000s. Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos thus focus on the prevalence of jus sanguini citizenship until the 1999 reform as the historical barrier to the integration of migrants in German society. The article also reviews the data available from surveys and reports to estimate the impact of the reform on the rates of naturalization in Germany. However, the authors point out that “the effects of the law have not yet been systematically evaluated, there are no surveys that would provide data on the effects of the new citizenship law of those who have opted to naturalize” (p. 64). The article also take into consideration parliamentary debates to examine how party politics affected the reform and its outcome, as well as discourses on immigration and integration that have worked to draw boundaries between German and migrants: this allows for an analysis on “how institutions and actors in the host society have responded to changes in citizenship policy and, in so doing, gain some insight into how changes in law have affected the process of incorporation” (p. 64). The authors acknowledge, however, that they lack “the kinds of data that might allow [them] to confirm unequivocally the effects of [integration] debates on immigrant and minority population” (p. 62). They also point out that research on the consequences of the Optionsmodell is unavailable (p. 56).

Findings: For Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos, the Optionsmodell of the citizenship law restricts the inclusionary potential of its jus soli component (p. 54). The Optionsmodell represents a political compromise between the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Liberals (FDP) and, “like many political compromises, the Optionsmodell is inconsistent, joining as it does two incompatible principles: jus soli and the formal rejection of dual citizenship” (p. 55). They argue that the Optionsmodell puts the onus to the children of immigrants born in Germany to show their attachment to Germany, but this “demand is not equally shared as only children whose parents are both non-German are subject to it; the children of German/non-German couples need not declare their choice—their allegiance is assumed and their ability to manage the demands of dual citizenship, whatever they may be, is unquestioned. Similarly, children born of Swiss nationals and European Union (EU) citizens are exempted from the Optionspflicht” (p. 57). As such, Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos point out the possible constitutional challenges
to the *Optionsmodell* that have been identified by German politicians and constitutional experts, in addition to other experts who have argued that the *Optionsmodell* is likely to result in a loss of EU citizenship. Moreover, the authors show that there may be differential incentives for EU versus third-country nationals to naturalize, although this might potentially differ for refugees (p. 58). Ultimately, they also identify the following several potentially exclusionary requirements as barriers to naturalization such as “the demand that foreigners formally acknowledge the liberal-democratic character of German society, as set out in the German Basic Law; the capacity to provide a basic standard of living for oneself and one’s dependents without recourse to state provided social assistance; and the ability to demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the German language and (since 2008) Germany’s political, legal and broader social order” (p. 61). These constitute “material and administrative barriers” which interact with symbolic constructions of migrants as outsiders or threats to social cohesion (p. 62). “In sum, a combination of symbolic and material barriers, as well as low incentives for citizens of EU member states and other rich industrialized countries, have combined to keep naturalization rates relatively low” (p. 63).

**Significance:** “In the final analysis, the 1999 citizenship reform marks an important but still only partial step toward the incorporation of immigrants in Germany, a point made clear when one considers the slow pace of immigrants’ political integration in the Federal Republic. Improving the integrative function of Germany’s citizenship regime will require further changes to both policy and official attitudes toward immigrants;” (p. 53). “Further progress regarding political incorporation, and incorporation more generally, will require a more sustained commitment on the part of the German state to encourage and facilitate the naturalization of foreigners. This, in turn, will necessitate a more basic shift in outlooks, such that immigrants and citizens of immigrant descent are not seen as untrustworthy and threatening outsiders, but as valued members of a diverse community of free and equal citizens. The obvious place to start in sending such signals of inclusion is with the young men and women who have already acquired their German citizenship by birth, and have been raised and socialized in the Federal Republic. Demanding that they validate their integration by compelling them to select their German citizenship over that of their parents is unfair and counterproductive. Not only does it threaten to create an administrative, legal and political quagmire, it also runs the risk of alienating hundreds of thousands of productive citizens needed to help meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The message that ought to be sent to all citizens of immigrant descent, whether by birth or naturalization, as well as to legal residents who qualify for citizenship, is that they are valued members of German society whose entry into the sphere of national membership is desired. Moving in this direction may help restore some of the promise of the 1999 citizenship reform” (p. 66).


Purpose: The chapters in this book engage in analyses of the ways in which the changes that have accompanied immigration, such as cultural and ethnic diversity, and social inequalities are managed in three different contexts: traditional settler societies (Canada, US, Australia, New Zealand), emigration-immigration societies (France, Germany), emerging economies (China, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong). The term social cohesion organizes the studies as well as the
critical commentaries on this concept presented in this book. However, the purpose of this book is “not to provide a single account of social cohesion but rather a portrait of its diversity” (Spoonley and Paul, p. 4). Social cohesion is treated as an umbrella term that helps frame discussions about social harmony, community well-being, and inclusion (Spoonley and Paul, p. 4). In addition, the various authors emphasize the need to differentiate between social cohesion as the desired outcome of policy and as an analytical construct in order to have a critical perspective on the limits of the concept and the challenges involved when it is applied to strengthen social relations across different groups.

Methods: Given the interdisciplinary approach of this book to social cohesion in different contexts, the studies utilize different methods. Discursive analysis of social cohesion debates (e.g. in the media, parliamentary sessions; policy documents); socio-historical analysis to changes in policy and legislation on citizenship and immigration are some examples of the methods used in the studies. The methods are primarily qualitative, which allows authors to put an emphasis on the social construction of narratives of social cohesion and their (potentially) beneficial or discriminatory effects.

Findings: The different studies and the critical commentaries presented in the book produce similar findings. A concern with social cohesion is legitimate in the different contexts examined because diversity is a demographic, ethno-cultural, religious, and social reality. It is important to identify ways to manage diversity that foster acceptance and can counter the marginalization and negative stereotyping of minority groups. In particular, the studies point out that social cohesion exists only in relation to something else, especially normative views of society that tend to be rooted in historical understandings of social relations and/or traditional values. According to the critical commentary by John Biles in this book, it is not diversity or immigrants but how they are perceived that leads to a sense of threat. To counter this, Biles argues, states must actively pursue social cohesion, taking into consideration the link between cohesion and inequality so that they can address the enabling factors for active citizenship (p. 325). Active citizenship is necessary as an element of truly democratic and representative institutions (p. 325). Ultimately, fostering social cohesion requires interventions involving inclusive policy and programs at multiple levels, not only minorities and newcomers benefit but all groups across society are taken into consideration.


The article examines employment characteristics of non-permanent resident workers from 2006 census data (focuses on the population of 94,000 workers who worked full-time among the larger population of 112,000 workers in this class).

The article identifies four fundamental differences between non-permanent resident workers and comparable permanent residents: (1) employment is often conditional; (2) there is a potential negative impact on families; (3) they may experience barriers in access to labour rights; and (4) they lack the right to stay permanently in Canada.

Derrick found that access to the labour market was “conditional” for about 2/3rds of temporary residents with the right to work in Canada between January 2006 and December 2008, who faced restrictions on the type of job, where and with whom they worked. Here there is a distinction between various classes of non-permanent residents. Whereas refugee claimants
generally obtained open work permits “allowing them to move about in Canada and accept virtually any job without restriction”, others receive closed permits that may “restrict the type of job they hold, the location where they work and/or the specific employer for whom they work” such as temporary foreign worker program participants and international students (36).

In terms of family impact: Non-permanent resident workers are generally allowed to bring spouses and dependents if they can demonstrate financial capacity to support; however, low-waged workers may not be able to meet this requirement, and some domestic workers and live-in caregivers are “explicitly prevented from bringing dependents with them” (37). Even though NPR have the same labour rights and access to health and social programs, there is variation by province and most programs and jurisdictions require minimum periods of work or residence in order to qualify (37). Without the right to remain permanently in Canada, these workers may have to leave the country if permits expire or if reasons for being in Canada change (37).


Valiani argues that, in addition to the shift from permanent to temporary migration, we are also seeing a shift toward an employer-driven immigration system that “does not bode well for the long-term needs of building an inclusive society and stable labour supply in Canada (55). The chapter includes a section on the most recent policy shifts, arguing that we are seeing a shift from public to private decision-making around pathways to permanent residency (62). These changes include:

- In 2008, the creation of the Canadian Experience Class: argues that “within the context of weakened and poorly enforced employment standards legislation” this renders migrants more “dependent and exploitable” by employers since applications are dependent or conditional on employer approval after completing 12-24 months of FTE (62).
- Amendments to IRPA in June 2008 give power to the Minister of CIC to issue “periodically changing instructions regarding processing of applications” for PR status. This replaced the first-come first-serve system previously enshrined in the IRPA (63).
- Then in November 2008, CIC published a list of 38 occupations (updated in June 2010 to 29 occupations) that would be given priority in being considered for PR status. Valiani points out that this list is similar to the “employer-driven” list of “Occupations under pressure” produced by the federal government in 2006, which reduced from 6-weeks to 1-week the length of time that an employer needs to advertise a position before being able to claim a labour shortage and recruit temporary workers (61).

Valiani’s analysis of these changes shows problem of employer-driven immigration in terms of pathways to permanent residency, using Live-In Caregiving Program as a case study (66-67). For the period of 2003-2007, decreasing estimated retention rates (ERR) to as low as 28%, indicate that the LCP was “less successful” in retaining temporary migrant workers, and that the ERR “diminishes over time” because although more migrants are drawn in due to “high demand” and the promise of PR, the number of PR granted remain “fairly stable as workers could not fulfil program requirements and were obliged to extend their temporary status for periods of up to four years” (67). Numbers of spouses and dependents gaining PR status are also lower compared to applicants of other programs in the same period 2003-2007.
Stats re: CEC in 2009, 1774 primary applicants and 770 dependents were admitted to CEC for a total of 2544, which was well below the expected 25,500 permanent residents that the government expected to retain through the CEC program in 2009. (68).

**Winter, Elke. 2014. Becoming Canadian: Making Sense of Recent Changes to Citizenship Rules. IRPP Study No. 44. Montreal.**

**Region**: Canada

**Purpose**: To review changes made to Canadian citizenship policy between 2006 and 2013 in light of international debates in citizenship and naturalization. The author aims to answer three questions: “1) What are the recent changes to the naturalization process in Canada? 2) What is the scope of these changes? 3) How does Canada compare internationally?” (p. 3).

**Methods**: Literature/policy review.

**Findings**: 1) “…the naturalization process has become longer and much more cumbersome over the past decade. This has particularly affected the less educated and those whose mother tongue is neither English nor French” (p. 1). 2) “…depicting prospective citizens as fraudulent and mischievous can fan insecurity and distrust in the population. This holds true for singling out specific religions and cultures as potentially less adaptable than others” (p. 1). 3) The “increased emphasis — in the citizenship guide and elsewhere — on Canada’s military history, British traditions and the monarchy […] runs counter to the ethos of multiculturalism, which replaced the dominant ideology of conformity to Anglophone norms around 40 years ago” (p. 1). 4) These developments should be monitored “not least because they convey messages that may be counterproductive to the successful integration of immigrants from diverse backgrounds” (p. 1).

**Significance**: 1) Reinforces the point that policy and implementation (i.e. the actual process of acquiring citizenship) are two different things; even if the former is relatively open, difficulties with the latter can have detrimental effects on individuals’ ability to identify positively with their new country of citizenship (see stuff on the UK). 2) Supports arguments made elsewhere that immigrants’ sense of belonging is affected by the level of discursive support/affirmation they receive; in this sense, negative discourses are potentially as harmful as negative policies and administrative practices. 3) Reinforces the point made elsewhere that Canadian national identity is not value-neutral.


**Region**: Canada

**Purpose**: Offers a historical account of Canadian citizenship from the inception of the first citizenship act in 1947 until present day, in order to contextualize more recent changes to
citizenship in Canada. Argues that there are three major phases in the evolution of Canadian citizenship that precede the current phase: the first phase was premised on the wish to be distinct from its British; the second phase starting in the mid-1960s was focused on the “de-ethnicization” of Canadian citizenship; the third phase starts in the 1980s with economic neo-liberalization (which led to the “cheapening” of nationalization procedures and citizenship education) and concerns about national unity that halted legislation for two decades and reinforced a “shallow” definition of citizenship (96). Argues that the amendments to the Citizenship Act in 2008 and the new citizenship study guide introduced in 2009 and 2010 mark a fourth phase involving the “renationalization” of Canadian citizenship, by giving “new meaning to the typical markers of citizenship, such as territory, descent and shared history/ values” (96).

Methods: Socio-historical analysis of legislation and policy changes. Qualitative.

Findings: Shows how the renationalization of Canadian citizenship marks a significant departure from previous phases. Identifies a potential “double standard” that is “troublesome” in the “first generation limitation” clause introduced in the 2008/2009 amendments to the Citizenship Act, which restricts inheritance to the first generation of children born abroad to Canadian citizens. This clause marks a departure from a “cornerstone” in Canadian citizenship from its inception, which has historically placed ‘Canadians by birth’ and ‘Canadians by choice’ on equal legal footing (117). The double standard becomes evident when this change is placed in context with the second amendment introduced in 2008/2009 for repatriating “Lost Canadians”, which due to historical factors was essentially limited to “White, Christian, and English-speaking” second generation expatriates, thus imbuing the notion “of descent (jus sanguinis) with new meaning” (116). A second problematic involves the intensification of class-based inequalities through the first generation limitation, where “only fairly well-to-do Canadians are able to circumvent the legislation by arranging for travel and accommodation in order to give birth on Canadian territory when living/working abroad” (116). This contrasts with recent immigrants and naturalized Canadians who “engage in transnational activities” in order to “make a living” (111). Finally, using a detailed review of the new citizenship study guide, shows how this marks a “stark contrast” from discussions of national belonging in the 1990s. There seems to be a new divide between founding members and newcomer immigrants, which is described as “a ‘thick’ communitarian notion of citizenship, which includes Aboriginals, English and French Canadians unconditionally, but admits newcomers and second or third generation immigrants only on the condition that they at least partially give up their heritage cultures and assimilate to ‘our’ values and ways of life” (117).